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ABSTRACT
REDUCING DISPARITY IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING:
A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
by
SIEGFRIED LUDWIG SPORER
University of New Hampshire, 1980

Researchers from diverse disciplines— e.g.
sociologists, criminologists, political scientists, legal
observers, and most recently also psychologists— have
studied judicial sentencing.

More than half a century of

research, employing multiple methodologies, strongly
demonstrates that the unguided use (or abuse) of discretion
has frequently led to vast disparity in judicial sentencing;
i.e.

large variations among sentences given for highly

similar offenses and/or offenders.

Among the various reform

proposals reviewed, sentencing councils have been suggested
as a constructive solution to reduce sentencing disparity
without abandoning judicial discretion or displacing
disparity to other agents in the criminal justice system.
The present research attempts to demonstrate the
disparity reducing effect of discussion in sentencing
councils in a controlled laboratory setting.

From a social

psychological perspective, sentencing a criminal offender
xii
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can be conceptualized as judging an ambiguous stimulus
object.

Convergence toward the mean of the sentencing

decisions (reduction of variability) was predicted as a
function of group discussion in line with theories of norm
formation processes (e.g.
1936;

Moscovici, 1974;

Sherif & Sherif, 1969).

Sherif, 1935,

Discussion of goals of

judicial sentencing was expected to further reduce
variability.

Also of interest was whether or not writing

down the sentencing decision prior to discussion would make
judges less susceptible to group influence processes.

In

line with the polarization hypothesis (Moscovici &
Zavalloni, 1969;

Myers & Lamm, 1976;

Lamm & Myers, 1978),

penalty shifts (leniency or severity) were also predicted as
a function of group discussion.
Extending the Solomon-four-group design, this study
crossed three levels of the council factor
council, and extended council)
(no pretest and pretest).

(no council,

with two pretest conditions

College students

(N = 277)

simulated mock judges who were presented a description of a
case of armed robbery.

As predicted, variability within

councils was considerably less as a function of discussion
in three-member councils and this effect was stronger for
mock judges who had not written down their sentences than
for those who had committed themselves that way.

There were

no differences in within council variability between the
council and the extended council condition but somewhat less
overall variability was observed in the extended council
xiii
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condition as compared to the no-council condition.

There

was no evidence for leniency and/or severity shifts.
The reduction of variability findings provide strong
support for the postulation of norm formation processes as
function of qroup discussion.

The observed commitment

effect, and its absence in the no-pretest conditions, are
also compatible with this interpretation.

Contrasting

traditional inductive approaches to validity with more
recent deductive approaches, the applicability of these
theoretical principles to real world sentencing councils is
argued.

The implementation of sentencing councils on a

trial basis, in which council members do not write down
their sentences before discussion, is recommended.
Sentencing councils would be expected to reduce sentencing
disparity to some extent but would have to be supplemented
by other structural and procedural innovations that could
also be investigated within the theory-testing
interventionist approach promulgated here.

xiv

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

CHAPTER

I

SENTENCING DISPARITY: THE KEY PROBLEM IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING

The Need for Studying Judicial Sentencing
Historically, back to the earliest stages of psychology
as an independent discipline, there has been a mutual
interest of legal scholars and psychologists in each others'
disciplines.

Legal scholars have looked to psychology for

answers they regarded to be of a psychological nature, and
psychologists have been eager to analyze some of the legal
issues of interest to them.

Periods of enthusiasm have

given way to periods of disillusionment, and vice versa.
Throughout these periods of interaction, the scope of the
type of issues being addressed has always been restricted to
a relatively narrow set of topics (see, for example Arntzen,
1980;

Gross, 1908;

Munsterberg, 1907;

Tapp, 1976;

Undeutsch, 1967).
Only most recently has there been an upsurge in
research at the interface of psychology and the law that has
exploded the topical boundaries of the past.

Continually

more issues are being tackled by psychological
investigators, especially within the criminal justice system
(for a plethora of examples see Bermant, Nemeth, & Vidmar,

1
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1976;

Friedman & Macaulay, 1977;

Hastie, 1978;
1975;

Sales, 1977;

Tapp & Levine, 1977?

Marshall, 1980;

Saks &

Shaver, Gilbert, & Williams,
Thibaut & Walker, 1975).

Collaborative efforts of the two disciplines are
becoming institutionalized through the foundation of
journals and interdisciplinary graduate programs,
conferences, publications, and research funding

(Tapp,

1976) .
Despite this massive extension in scope, research
efforts are not equally distributed over the many issues to
which psychologists could contribute.

For example, there is

an abundance of research on one of the key institutions of
the American legal system, the jury, but relatively little
effort is spent on the role of other key figures in the
courtroom, such as the prosecutor and the trial judge (Saks
& Hastie, 1978;

Shaver et al., 1975).

The trial judge

holds a central position in trial court (Frankel, 1972;
Saks & Hastie, 1978), and it is his/her decision-making
process of arriving at a criminal sentence that is the focus
of this investigation.
The sentencing behavior of the judge is the most
significant of his/her activities, and the reasons for
studying this decision-making process have been succinctly
summarized by Sutton

(1978a):

There can be little doubt that, however
justifiable, the imposition of criminal sentence
is one of the most substantial intrusions the
State can effect upon individual liberty.
Judges
are given nearly unparalleled discretion over the
lives of millions who come before them each year.
Bounded only by the broadest of statutory
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constraints, the sentencing judge is generally
empowered to exact penalties ranging from little
more than verbal reprimand to life imprisonment or
even death.
Although not all offenders face such
a range of sentences, sentences actually imposed
for each offense category tend to cover the
statutorily allowed range. That discretion of
such formidable consequence should be
authorized— indeed, that it should be exercised so
variably— should provide not only a justification
but a compulsion to examine the manner of its use.
(p. 1)
Judicial Sentencing, Discretion, and Sentencing Disparity
The decisional power of the judge is inherent in
his/her exercise of discretion that allows him/her to arrive
at decisions in a free and independent manner, only governed
by his/her conscience and the rules and spirit of the law
(Shaver et a l ., 1975).

This vast opportunity at discretion

has led to an often deplored disparity among judicial
sentences, i.e.

large variations among judges in deciding

upon highly similar offenses and/or similar offenders have
been frequently observed and amply documented by legal
scholars, political scientists, sociologists, and
psychologists

(for reviews, see Austin & Utne, 1977;

& Williams, 1977;
Cole, 1973;

Bullock, 1961;

Dershowitz, 1976;

Hood & Sparks, 1970;

Austin

Chiricos & Waldo, 1975;

Hagan, 1974;

Hogarth, 1971;

O'Donnell, Churgin, & Curtis, 1977;

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, Task Force Report:
1978;

Sutton, 1978a;

The Courts, 1967;

Sporer,

Zimmerman, 1976).
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In light of such massive evidence— some more and some
less conclusive— it is again and again surprising to find
investigators who feel a need to establish the existence of
disparity de novo after half-a-century of research on this
issue.

Of course, many of the studies, particularly some of

the earlier ones, are fraught with methodological problems
and subject to rival explanations
Williams, 1977;
1975;

(critically, see Austin &

Chiricos & Waldo, 1975;

Hood & Sparks, 1970;

Diamond & Zeisel,

Sutton, 1978a;

Zeisel, 1969).

But the very fact that sentencing disparity has been studied
with the whole gamut of the methodological armamentarium,
ranging from collection of anecdotal evidence, case
histories,

in-depth interviews, questionnaire surveys, and

large scale archival studies to controlled experimental
simulations, increases our confidence in the existence of
this phenomenon on the basis of the mutual corroboration
achieved through triangulation and multiple operationism
(Diamond & Zeisel, 1975;
1966;

generally, see Campbell & Stanley,

Cook & Campbell, 1979;

Seechrest, 1966;

Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, &

Zeisel, 1969).

This countdown on sentencing disparity should not be
mistaken as a countdown on judicial discretion, or a call
for its abolition.

To be sure, the issue is not one of

whether or not to allow discretion at all.

Discretion is at

the heart of our criminal justice system (Davis, 1969;
Shaver et al., 1975;
Committee, 1971).

critically, American Friends Service

It is considered essential to guarantee
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flexibility in a penal system that attempts to make
punishment fit not only the crime but also the criminal.
The concern is with abuse of discretion.

This abuse of

discretion runs counter to the constitutionally guaranteed
right to equality of treatment before the law (cf.
1966;

Zimmerman, 1976).

Rubin,

The judge's function is then to

navigate between the Scylla of inequality and the Charybdis
of rigidity and flexibility.
The evidence accumulated above indicates that the
pendulum of judicial decision-making has swung too far to
the side of unrestrained discretion and resulting
inequality, and that it is time to strike a better balance
again.

Understanding Sentencing Disparity:
Its Roots in the Statutory Sentencing Framework
At the very heart, sentencing disparity is a function
of unguided judicial discretion in the absence of
"substantive control or guidance"

(Kadish, 1962).

The

possibility of abuse of discretion is inherent in the
judge's power to choose among a great variety of sentencing
options virtually without legal guidance or control.
O'Donnell et al.

As

(1977) have observed:

The lack of "substantive control or guidance"
for sentencing judges is evident in Title 18 of
the United States Code, which contains most of the
federal criminal statutes and penalties.
Bereft
of sentencing standards for judges, this chaotic
patchwork of penalties authorized by individual
statutes, enacted at different times and having no
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relationship to each other, has established a
bizarre range of penalties for an enormous variety
of criminal activities.(p. 1, notes omitted)
This chaotic state of affairs observed at the federal level
is reflected, and probably exacerbated, at the state level
(Frankel, 1972).

Consider for a moment the vast array of

sentencing alternatives, subject of regional modifications,
a sentencing judge can choose, including combinations
thereof (cf.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and

the Administration of Justice, 1967):
He/she can decide
—

whether or not to impose a fine;
the magnitude of the fine;

—

whether to incarcerate the offender or put him/her on
probation
the maximum length of the prison term;
the minimum length of the prison term (parole
eligibility):
the length of the probation sentence;

—

whether or not to sentence the offender under the Youth
Corrections Act, or similar provisions for subpopulations
of offenders;

—

whether or not to commit the offender for observation and
study, or psychiatric examination etc.;

—

whether or not to suspend a sentence.
This wide range of sentencing alternatives provided by

statutory sentencing frameworks of the individual states
allows for maximum flexibility of the judge to fit the
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punishment to the individual offender and the circumstances
of the crime.

This individualized treatment model of

sentencing had its historical origins in the rise of the
rehabilitative ideal during the post-Civil War period, and
progressed through the adoption of indeterminate sentencing
laws by many states in this country (for a review of the
historical development, see Dershowitz, 1976;
1977) .

Rothman,

Until most recently, almost all the states had some

form or another of a mixed sentencing model which, in
essence, is a compromise between legislatively fixed,
judicially fixed and administratively fixed sentencing
models (Dershowitz, 1976).
For example, a sentencing judge who is to decide a
felony case (e.g.

armed robbery)

for which the legislature

has provided a sentencing range from seven-and-one-half to
fifteen years in that particular state may sentence the
defendant to eight years minimum to twelve years maximum of
imprisonment, leaving the ultimate decision of release of
the defendant to the parole board.

The parole board, in

turn, may schedule the first parole meeting after about
five-and-one-half years,

i.e.

the minimum sentence minus

the amount of "good time" credit which may be forfeited as a
function of misbehavior in prison

(see American Bar

Association Commission on Correctional Facilities and
Services, 1974).

Thus, a substantial amount of discretion

is vested in the decisional power of both sentencing judge
and the parole board, and consequently the possibility of
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disparate outcomes ensues at both institutional decision
points.

Although the present study focuses on the

discretionary power of the sentencing judge, it will be wise
to keep in mind that the judge's decisions are being made
within the court as a system (e.g.

Saks & Hastie, 1978).

Therefore, they are both dependent upon, and determinants of
the actions of other criminal justice agents, especially the
prosecutor and correction officials

(e.g.

parole boards).

Unguided discretion of judges and/or parole boards had
its heyday under indeterminate sentencing laws, e.g.

in

California, and the subsequent disillusionment with the
individualized treatment model and rehabilitation outcomes
(e.g.

American Friends Service Committee, 1971;

1979;

Martinson, 1974;

Mitford, 1973;

Fogel,

Orland, 1979) has

led more and more states to shift toward the opposite
direction of various forms of determinate sentencing' (see
Alschuler, 1978;
1979;

Bagley, 1979;

von Hirsch, 1976;

Dershowitz, 1976;

Orland, 1979;

Fogel,

Interim Report of

the Sentencing Study Committee to Florida Supreme Court, n.
d.;

Lagoy, Hussey, & Kramer, 1978;

Twentieth Century Fund

Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, 1976).

Legislative

changes such as these and their actual and potential impact
will have to be taken into account in the interpretation of
an empirical analysis of sentencing behavior.
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Types of Sentencing Disparity
Some of the confusion about some of the differences in
findings of previous research on sentencing disparity have
arisen from the failure to take regional and temporal
variations into account (Hindelang, 1969;

Sutton, 1978a).

Many of the studies on judicial sentencing are rather
limited in scope, often focusing on a limited number of
offenses within specific jurisdictions within a limited time
period, making comparisons among them rather difficult
(Sutton, 1978a).

Therefore,

it is suggested that an

analysis of the study of sentencing variations should pay
attention both to the level of analysis (regional scope),
and the time dimension of the study.
S' ■

Levels of analysis and time may be conceived of as two
orthogonal dimensions within each of which several further
distinctions can be made.

Within the time dimension, we may

conveniently distinguish between relatively short-term and
relatively long-term variations in sentencing.

For example,

a single judge may give different sentences to highly
similar offenses and/or highly similar offenders as a
function of (short-term)
previous case sentenced

situational variables such as the
(Pepitone & DiNubile, 1976).

On the

other hand, his/her sentencing behavior may change as a
function of the number of years on the bench

(Hogarth,

1971) , or in the course of long-term historical-political
changes (e.g.

Rothman, 1977).
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With regard to the levels-of-analysis dimension,
several levels may be distinguished

(see also Hogarth, 1971,

for a somewhat different distinction).
encompassing levels, i.e.

At the highest most

at the cross-cultural and

cross-national levels, one would most obviously expect quite
different sentencing practices in different societies (e.g.,
compare the penal codes of different countries;
Hood & Sparks, 1970).

At the next lower level, sentencing

variation across states within the United States
Provinces in Canada)

(or

has been repeatedly noted for the

Federal Court System (e.g.

Administrative Office of the

United States Courts, 1972;
Hogarth, 1971;

see also

Frankel, 1967;

Frankel, 1972;

President's Commission of Law Enforcement

and the Administration of Justice, 1967;
Tiffany, Avichai, & Peters, 1975).

Sutton, 1978c;

For the State Court

System, geographical variations across states is obviously
necessitated by the differences in sentencing that are
legislatively fixed for each individual state (Seymour,
1977) .
One notch below this level, one may observe variations
across districts within a single state, i.e.

among courts

under the same statutory authority (Hogarth, 1971;
1963, cit.

in Hogarth, 1971;

Zimmerman, 1976).

Jaffary,
At the

lowest level of analysis, focusing on the individual as the
unit of analysis, variations across individual judges within
a single court (or within a state, or even across cultures)
have frequently been studied (e.g.

Gaudet, 1933, 1938,
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1949;

Gaudet, Harris, & St.

Hogarth, 1971;
Blumberg, 1967;

Nagel, 1962;

John, 1934;

Green, 1961;

Schubert, 1977;

Smith &

Winick, Gerver, & Blumberg, 1961).

Many of the latter approaches essentially employ an
individual differences approach which is geared to
discovering the "personal equation", i.e.
traits, attitudes, etc.
sentencing decisions.

personality

that may be useful in predicting
Hood & Sparks

(1970) and Hogarth

(1971) review some of these studies and criticize the
circularity of reasoning characteristic of some of them.
In studies of this kind, differences in sentencing
beviour which cannot be explained by known
differences in the kind of cases dealt with, are
usually attributed to the "policies," "attitudes,"
or even the "personalities" of the judge or
magistrate concerned.
Thus, punitive judicial
attitudes are inferred from apparently punitive
sentencing behaviour.
Judges are said to be
"tough-minded," tender-minded," "conservative,"
"liberal," "rigid," or "prejudiced," because their
sentences appear to be so.
To infer judicial
attitudes indirectly from judicial conduct and not
from specially designed questionnaires can lead to
circularity in reasoning.
It is arguable that one
should not, by observing sentencing behaviour,
impute an attitude and then employ that attitude
to explain the behaviour, but this is precisely
what most of these studies appear to do.
(Hogarth, 1971, p.
10)
Other studies within this general category have been
criticized by Sutton

(1978a)

for committing the "ecological

fallacy." Sutton's criticism also stresses the importance of
the levels-of-analysis distinction introduced here.
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Towards a Definition of Sentencing Disparity
The above distinctions have important implications for
a definition of sentencing disparity.

A rational discussion

of sentencing disparity will benefit from a consensus on the
type of sentencing disparity (i.e.
is being discussed).

what level of analysis

Although the terms disparity,

variability, and variation will be used here
coterminously— except when the latter refers to a
statistical term— it should be noted that not every
variation in sentencing necessarily deserves the label
"disparity." For example, variations across cultures or
nations are usually not denoted as disparities although
comparative analyses at this level also contribute to our
understanding of sentencing practices.

But more

importantly, the term sentencing disparity has negative
emotional overtones, and for many experts it usually
connotes inequality before the law, unfairness and
injustice.

Zimmerman (1976) has summarized this issue

succinctly:
The word "disparity" has been much used and
abused.
Sentencing disparity is best
characterized as unwarranted or unwanted
variability in sentencing;
it assumes that there
should be relative consistency in sentencing after
legitimate differences among cases have been
accounted for. The problem, of course, centers
around the definition of legitimate differences...
(p. 18)
"Legitimate" differences are generally accepted when
they arise as a function of "legal factors"

(Sporer, 1978,

1979, 1980) such as the type of offense or the number of
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prior convictions of the offender
occasionally debated;

cf.

(although the latter is

Frankel, 1972).

However, even

some of these legal factors may lead to disparate results in
sentencing outcomes in the absence of guidelines to
determine the weight they should be given in the sentencing
decision (Frankel, 1972;

Twentieth Century Fund Task Force

on Criminal Sentencing, 1976).

There is also a

middle-ground of factors subject to legal dispute, e.g.
guilty plea vs.

a

insistence on the right to trial, or the

number of prior arrests (not convictions), which make the
distiction between legal and extra-legal factors at times
difficult.
To arrive at stringent estimates of the magnitude of
sentencing disparity, as many of these factors as possible
will have to be controlled.

Archival studies that have

attempted to control for many of these variables through
"matching"

(the so-called "comparable case" method, Diamond

& Zeisel, 1975)

approximate this ideal but can always be

criticized because it will never be possible to know all the
possibly relevant variables and to control for them (Austin
& Williams, 1977;
1970;

Diamond & Zeisel.

Partridge & Eldridge, 1974).

1975;

Hood & Sparks,

The only method that

allows us to estimate the true magnitude of disparity is the
"identical case" method
"true experiment"

(Diamond & Zeisel, 1975), i.e.

(Campbell & Stanley, 1966;

Cook &

Campbell, 1979), in which identical cases are randomly
assigned to different judges whose sentences can then be
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directly compared.
The present investigation has used the latter approach,
and disparity will be defined accordingly as the variation
among individual judges sentencing an identical case
(identical offender convicted of an identical crime).
Within the levels-of-analysis and time dimension framework
suggested above, this definition addresses the issue of
disparity among individual judges within a single court and
also more generally among judges within the same statutory
authority at a particular point in time.
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CHAPTER II

REDUCING SENTENCING DISPARITY:
PROPOSALS FOR SENTENCING REFORM

Legal journals, scholarlyjbnd popular books, and
governmental and administrativen reports frequently make
suggestions for changing the judicial sentencing structure.
They are so numerous that it W'aTild be impossible to review
them all here.

Most of the arguments advanced are highly

repetitious, and very seldom supported by empirical
evidence.
common:

However, most of th^fii seem to have one thing in
They do acknowledge th&t sentencing disparity does

exist— to some greater or lesser extent— and that it has had
negative consequences for the criminal justice system and
the public's perception thereof-i

Therefore, many of these

proposals constitute attempts to reduce sentencing disparity
in one form or another, or to impose some external check on
sentencing decisions.

The mosticommon proposals are briefly

outlined here, along with some/of the drawbacks and common
criticisms thereof.

15
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Determinate Sentencing
During the last few years, about half a dozen states
have replaced the former indeterminate sentencing laws with
various forms of determinate sentencing provisions

(e.g.

Maine, California, Arizona, Illinois and Indiana), and about
another half a dozen other states are considering similar
legislation (cf.
1979;

Bagley, 1979;

Serrill, 1977).

Gettinger, 1977;

Orland,

These legislative reforms are a

response to the general disillusionment with the
rehabilitative model inherent in indeterminate sentencing,
offering instead a justice model

("justice-as-fairness,"

Fogel, 1979) and "fair and certain punishment"

(Twentieth

Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, 1976).
Determinate sentencing exists in various forms, such as
mandatory or minimum mandatory, flat-time, and presumptive
sentencing, each curbing discretion of the sentencing judge
to varying degrees.

However, it would be illusory to

believe that this would end the disparity problem.

More

likely, discretion will simply be displaced from judges and
parole boards to legislators, prosecutors and prison
discipline committees

(Alschuler, 1978;

Interim Report of

the Sentencing Study Committee to the Florida Supreme Court,
n.d.;

Orland, 1979).

Thus, the "sledgehammer" approach of

determinate sentencing may easily backfire by raising the
bargaining power of the prosecuting attorney even further,
an already serious problem and a thorn in the public's eye
(Alschuler, 1978;

President's Commission on Law Enforcement
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and Administration of Justice, 1967;

Saks & Hastie, 1978;

for a somewhat more optimistic perspective, see von Hirsch,
1976;

generally, on plea-bargaining, see Law and Society

Review, 1979, whole issue).

From a somewhat different

perspective, determinate sentencing laws also indicate a
shift of responsibility away from the judiciary to
legislative organs of society.

Well-intended as some of

these proposals may be, that attempt to reduce the
incarcerative tendencies of the present system (e.g.
Hirsch, 1976;

von

Twentieth Century Fund Task Force in Criminal

Sentencing, 1976)

they may easily fail when they are forced

to face up to public pressure toward crime control through
even longer prison sentences (zimring, 1976, cit.

in

Interim Report of the Sentencing Study Committee to the
Florida Supreme Court, n.d.).

Not only would this overcrowd

the prisons even more, but it would also throw us back to a
rigid and inhumane sentencing structure in which the
punishment only fits the crime but not the criminal.

Appellate Review of Sentencing
Much of the criticism of the disparity problem cited
above are directed at the fact that
at present the United States is the only nation in
the free world where one judge can determine
conclusively, decisively, and finally the minimum
period of time a defendant must remain in prison,
without being subject to any review of his
determination.
(Chief Judge Kaufman, 1964, cit.
in O'Donnell et al., 1977, p.
1)
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It seems obvious that appellate review of sentencing or
some other sentencing review board has been frequently
suggested to ameliorate this problem (e.g.
others:
1977;

Frankel, 1972;

Gaylin, 1974;

O'Donnell et al., 1977;

among many

Morris & Hawkins,

D'Esposito, 1969;

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, 1967).

However, unsettled issues remain:

Who

should do the reviewing— the already overburdened appellate
courts or a sentencing review panel (as for example,
Georgia or New Hampshire)?

in

Should the reviewing court be

only allowed to reduce the sentence (creating the
possibility of frivolous appeals), or also be allowed to
increase it (critically, see Frankel, 1972;
cf.

also D'Esposito, 1969, n.

Gaylin, 1974;

92, for constitutional

objections regarding double jeopardy)?

There are also some

additional problems related to the fact that Appellate Court
judges are generally trained to decide on matters of law,
not sentencing policy, and that they are too removed from
the trial and the defendant who is not given the possibility
of allocution (cf.

O'Donnell et al., 1977).

Last but not

least, appellate review may be regarded as an insufficient
solution to the disparity problem because it can only remedy
the problem after the fact— a time-consuming process— but
never prevent it.
On the other hand, the possibility of review may
refrain judges from excessive sentencing decisions,
especially when they are required to put their reasons for
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their decision into writing a sentencing opinion.

Appellate

reviews may also be helpful in the establishment of
sentencing guidelines which could aid judges to structure
judicial discretion.

Sentencing Guidelines
Another response to the lack of control in judicial
sentencing power is the call for sentencing guidelines and
explicit sentencing criteria.

O'Donnell et a l .

(1977) and

the Sentencing Study Committee to the Florida Supreme Court
(Interim Report, n.d.) have recently elaborated some
detailed proposals that make use of the positive aspects of
many of the earlier suggestions and at the same time try to
minimize some of the weaknesses of them.

One of the

positive features of these proposals is that they preserve
discretion and the possibility of flexible individualization
while at the same time subjecting these decision-making
processes to legislative guidelines.

They also require of

these decision-making processes that they be made explicit
and therefore subject to public inspection and judicial
review.
For example, the Proposed Federal Sentencing Statute
described by O'Donnell et a l .

requires an explicit brief

statement of reasons for the sentence imposed as part of the
record on a routine basis, to be disclosed to the defendant
at the time of sentencing.

This proposal also requires

explicit consideration of the goals of sentencing,

i.e.
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deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
denunciation.

The development of the guidelines with

respect to recommended normal sentence is delegated to an
independently established United States Commission on
Sentencing and Corrections.
These proposals open some new avenues, t.he consequences
of which can hardly yet be anticipated.

They offer some

distinct advantages, especially when coupled with some of
the other approaches that deserve attention in the future.
One of the key problems underlying this approach, as well as
the presumptive sentencing approach to which it is similar,
does not seem adequately faced:

For one thing, this

approach presupposes an adequate detailed taxonomy of
criminal behavior which we simply do not possess, and
secondly it presupposes a knowledge of adequate criteria for
the prediction of dangerousness of offenders which are
similarly nonexistent
see Levine, 1977;
Shah, 1978) .

(on the prediction of dangerousness,

Monahan, 1976;

Monahan & Hook, 1978;

The latter problem, of course, is a dilemma

faced by any approach to sentencing and can therefore not be
held against a singular reform effort.

Other Approaches
Numerous other approaches have been suggested to remedy
the sentencing disparity problem at one time or another.
Suggestions include a more careful selection of judges, a
better training and education of judges, continuing
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education of judges, e.g.
various sentencing issues;

through sentencing institutes on
improvements in presentence

investigations and presentence reports;
to judges;
many others.

continual feedback

information storage and retrieval systems, among
Some of these suggestions have more

far-reaching implications than others, and some of them may
be very useful in ameliorating sentencing dispartiy.

It

would be impossible to discuss them here in any detail.
However, there is one other institution that has been
frequently suggested:

sentencing councils.

I shall first

describe some of the operating characteristics of sentencing
councils and then examine some of the claims that have been
made for their effectiveness.
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CHAPTER III

SENTENCING COUNCILS

Sentencing Councils vs. Sentencing Tribunals
Before I give a description of sentencing councils, it
will be necessary to distinguish them from sentencing
tribunals (Frankel, 1972).

In sentencing tribunals, the

responsibility of sentencing is taken away from a single
individual and laid in the hands of a sentencing tribunal
(usually three members)
sentencing decision.

who are to arrive jointly at a

Tribunals may not only consist of

judges but also contain other "experts"— such as
sociologists, psychologists, or educators (Frankel, 1972;
Glueck, 1936)— whose special knowledge is considered
beneficial to an optimal disposition of a defendant.
However, recent research into the prediction of
dangerousness and the vicissitudes of rehabilitation (cf.
Chapters I and II) makes it unlikely that any professional
would be agreed upon to be especialy equipped for the
sentencing task.

Therefore, this somewhat idealistic notion

is not likely to find many supporters.

22
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A second notion underlying the sentencing tribunal is
more fundamental:

In sentencing tribunals, the decisional

power is taken away from the individual judge, and delegated
to the tribunal as a collective.

In sharp

contradistinction, in sentencing councils the sentencing
decision remains solely in the hands of the individual
sentencing judge;
advisory.

the council's function is purely

Thus, the judge's constitutionally guaranteed

upon independence of judgment is not impaired.

This makes

the sentencing council a more palatable candidate for reform
within the present constitutional framework.

Description of Sentencing Councils
Motivated by the awareness of the injustices created by
sentencing disparity that were revealed at sentencing
institutes (Hosner, 1970), federal court judges of the
Eastern District of Michigan

(Detroit)

started to convene at

a regular basis to share their sentencing problems.

Shortly

thereafter, these meetings were formally instituted as
sentencing councils consisting of three judges.

Council

membership was rotated so that judges partook in different
councils at different times.

Soon other districts followed

suit, and sentencing councils of various sizes (temporarily
from two to nine judges) were created by the Eastern
District of New York in 1962, the Northern District of
Illinois in 1963, and recently, the District of Oregon
(Diamond & Zeisel, 1975);

Frankel, 1972).
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Parsons

(1964) described the procedure typically

followed by the Eastern District of Michigan, and emulated
by other districts:
Under the practice of our district, these meetings
are held for an hour in the morning, before the
commencement of the day's routine, when the judges
may give the matters their undivided attention.
The judges meet in panels of three, each judge
having the presentence investigation report from
the probation department and having prepared a
study sheet, not only for the offenders he must
sentence, but also for those who are the primary
responsibility of the other two judges.
Customarily, the one judge will call his first
case, merely stating the name of the offender and
giving a brief statement of the offense.
He will
then state to his brother judges the factors in
his judgment, believed to be controlling as to
disposition, and will recommend a disposition to
be made.
Each of the other two judges will then
give, in turn, the factors believed by him to be
controlling, together with his recommended
sentence.
The sentences wil normally vary,
although I have observed with a great deal of
interest that the sentences of judges working
together in this manner tend, as times goes on, to
approach a common ground.
It is in the discussion
following the recommedation as to sentencing that
the Council performs its most useful function....
The weights assigned the various factors thought
to be controlling as to disposition of the case
are sometimes modified by the sentencing judge in
the light of the experience of his brother judges
with their own previous sentences.
(p. 431-432)
This description of three-member councils characterizes
the prototype of sentencing council procedures, although
there are some regional variations.

Participants in

sentencing councils have reported on their successes with
great enthusiasm (e.g.
1969;

Smith, 1963;

Doyle, 1961;

Hosner, 1970;

Levin,

Zavatt, 1967), and various authors and

agencies have recommended them for widespread use (e.g.
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for
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Criminal Justice, 1971;

Frankel, 1972;

National Advisory

Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals:
Corrections, 1973;

President's Commission on Law

Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967;

critical:

Interim Report to the Sentencing Study Committee to the
Florida Supreme Court, n.d.).

A Preliminary Evaluation of Sentencing Councils
The goal of sentencing councils is not necessarily
total uniformity in sentencing but rather the mutual
exchange of ideas on sentencing philosophies which should
lead to the development of sentencing standards.

They

should also provide a safeguard against excessive sentences
on either side of the scale.

Sentencing councils have also

been claimed to have reduced sentencing disparity,at least
among judges within a given jurisdiction (i.e.

at the

lowest level of analysis in terms of our analysis proposed
above;

Hosner, 1970;

Levin, 1969;

Smith, 1963;

Zavatt,

1967) .

Additionally, they supposedly have resulted in less

severe sentences, especially in terms of an increased
tendency to utilize nonincarcerative sentencing alternatives
(e.g.

probation;

Levin, 1969;

Zavatt, 1967).

The latter tendency would also indicate a desirable
feature in the view of other recent reform committees (e.g.
von Hirsch, 1976;

Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on

Criminal Sentencing, 1976).

Hosner

(1970) has pointed out

that the council proceedings had additional positive effects
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on the work of the probation office and specifically the
preparation of presentence reports when probation officers
were present in council hearings and could in this way learn
how their information was utilized by the judges for their
sentencing decisions.

More generally, he praised the

improvement of the relationship between judges and
corrections as a function of the interchanges between judges
and probation officers.
It should be noted however, that all the above claims
are based on "insider's" evaluations.

We know from the

growing body of literature on research on program evaluation
about the limitations of inside evaluations
Ball, 1978).

(see Anderson &

The richness of informal observations does not

outweigh the advantages of detached, objective assessment
that modern evaluation research requires.

Many of the

observations provided by these authors are rather informal,
such as illustrative descriptions of cases in which
sentencing councils were especially beneficial.

Some of the

reports do present data obtained from court records and/or
abstracted from records kept on the council meetings
1969;

(Levin,

Zavatt, 1967) but the data are only descriptive

statistics indicating the number of cases dealt with by the
sentencing councils, or the number and kind of changes from
the initial recommendations of the presiding judges to their
final dispositions.

The data are provided over several

years of the councils' operation.
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These data are useful summary statistics but pose
severe methodological restrictions on their interpretation.
The claims are not stated as falsifiable hypotheses, and are
not subjected to rigorous statistical tests.

Although

seasonal trends could possibly be inferred on their basis,
interpretations are severely limited by the plausible rival
hypotheses threatening pre-experimental or time-series
designs wihout comparable control groups (Campbell &
Stanley, 1966;

Cook & Campbell, 1979).

For example, the increase in proportion of probation
sentences for the first five years of the council's
operation at the Eastern District of Michigan (Levin, 1967)
could be a function of the sentencing council but could also
be simply a reflection of a general maturational trend
towards less incarcerative sentences during this time
period.
1966;

Only a control series design (Campbell & Stanley,
Cook & Campbell, 1979) would allow us to rule out

maturation as a plausible rival hypothesis given that the
relative frequency of offense categories had also been
controlled for.
Apart from the difficulties in evaluating some of the
claimed advantages of sentencing councils more conclusively,
sentencing councils have the additional advantage that they
offer an "optimizing strategy"
disparity problem.

(Zimmerman, 1976)

to the

This approach keeps discretion as a

vital principal of judicial sentencing intact while at the
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"equality before the law" more likely.
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CHAPTER IV

SENTENCING COUNCILS:
A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Sentencing:
Decision-making in an Ambiguous Stimulus Situation
"There is no decision in the criminal process that is
so complicated and so difficult to make as that of the
sentencing judge."

(The Challenge of Crime in a Free

Society— A Report of the President1s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967, p.141) .
With this quote, John Hogarth opened his classic study on
the sentencing behavior of magistrates in Ontario, Canada:
Sentencing as a Human Process (1971) .
better description in a few words.
human decision-making process.

There could be no

Sentencing is a complex

In other words, sentencing

is a psychological decision-making process, determined by
all the personal and environmental variables that have been
found to influence any other human decision-making process.
Decision-making processes in the criminal justice
system are characterized by the principle of discretion
(Shaver et al., 1975).

The principle of discretion is a

unifying principle that marks an ideal entrance point for
29
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the social-psychological study of legal decision-making
processes.

As Shaver et a l .

(1975) put it:

Although "bounded by rules," the exercise of
discretion is an individual action, affected by
the actor's attributions, attitudes, values,
social status and role, and numerous other factors
of interest to social psychologists.
(p. 472)
But once we recognize the importance of discretion for
a social-psychological analysis where do we go from there?
Which theory or set of theories is most pertinent to an
adequate understanding of sentencing behavior?

From

psychophysical scaling to equity theory, from theories of
attitude and opininon change to attribution and information
integration theory, any of these theories may or may not be
relevant (see, for example Austin & Utne, 1977;

Pepitone,

1975, 1976).
When we return to our focus on sentencing as a complex
decision-making process, there is one aspect of the
sentencing decision that is frequently overlooked:

Although

the task of sentencing is relatively well-defined, i.e.
there is a specified set of decision-alternatives from which
the judge may choose— see Chapter I— there is no correct
answer to the problem of finding a sentence best suited to
the offender for his/her offense at hand.

Given the paucity

of information available to the judge about the offender at
the time of sentencing, including the general problem of our
relative inability to predict violence (e.g.
Monahan, 1976;

Monahan & Hood, 1978;

Levine, 1977;

Shah,1978) ,

sentencing can be best described as an analogue to the
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judgment of an ambiguous stimulus (the defendant and his/her
actions and life circumstances).

The task of the judge

becomes one of integrating all the relevant information
about the offender and his/her offense, and to scale it on
one of several dimensions, e.g.

probation or incarceration,

magnitude of fine, or length of prison sentence.
It has been a long-known fact within the Gestalt
tradition of social psychology that "the more unstructured
the external stimulus situation, the greater the
contribution of internal factors— including internalized
social values and standards."
62).

(Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p.

Translated into the context of judicial sentencing,

this proposition would indicate that in the absence of
precise sentencing laws (determinate sentences)

and in the

absence of sentencing guidelines, coupled with the scanty
knowledge about offender and offense, the personality and
values of the judge, e.g.

his/her attitudes and

particularly his/her sentencing philosophy, would determine
the sentencing decision.

Empirical evidence, both from

field studies and laboratory simulations corroborate this
proposition (Hogarth, 1971;

McFatter, 1978).

If the assumption of the offender/offense as relatively
ambiguous stimulus is correct,

it should come as no surprise

that sentencing decisions are as variable as they have been
documented to be.

In analogy to the classic findings with

the autokinetic effect paradigm (Sherif, 1935, 1936), great
variability in judgment— e.g.

the "magnitude estimation" of
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number of years of imprisonment— would be expected when
neither reference points (other people's judgments)

nor

guidelines (norms) are present.
This perspective has several advantages.

It makes

sentencing variability an understandable human process, and
renders discussions about the rationality or irrationality
in sentencing superfluous
Sparks, 1970).

(cf.

Austin & Utne, 1977;

Hood &

But more importantly, it opens a wide and

well-established vista of theory and research in social
psychology that can guide us to find ways to reduce
sentencing disparity.

Of course, the specific parameters

will have to be fleshed out in more detail before we can
arrive at useful predictions.

Sentencing Councils and the Social Psychology o_f Groups
The decisional procedure followed by sentencing
councils:

Tentative judgment alone, discussion, judgment

alone by the sentencing judge, is identical to one of the
oldest research paradigms in experimental psychology (e.g.
the experiments by Munsterberg, 1914;
Jenness, 1933;

Allport, 1924;

or last but not least Sherif's classic

experiments on the production of social norms, 1935, 1936).
Not only is there a striking match in paradigm but there are
other similarities as well that make the results of many of
the studies on conformity arising from the Sherif tradition
highly relevant for sentencing councils.

For example, both

approaches are usually concerned with the judgment of an
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ambiguous stimulus— here, the offender and his/her
actions— and the very factors that have been shown to
operate in the laboratory to create the convergence toward
the mean— Sherif's famous "funnel-shaped" curve— are likely
to be at work in sentencing councils as well
see Hollander, 1971;
Moscovici, 1974;

(for reviews,

Lorge, Fox, Davitz & Brenner, 1958;

Shaw, 1976;

Sherif & Sherif, 1969).

Thus, one interesting finding of the above studies is
that the newly acquired norm seems to persevere even in the
absence of the reference group (Hood & Sherif, 1962).

In

our case, the judge, when he/she is by him/herself in making
up the sentence after the discussion would be expected to
continue to be influenced by the other council members'
judgments.

Findings from sentencing councils in operation

in several federal districts
Levin, 1969;

(Diamond & Zeisel, 1975;

Zavatt, 1967) as well as from a simulation of

sentencing councils conducted by Zimmerman (1976) confirm
this proposition.

After the discussion, when judges were by

themselves and had sole responsibility to make the final
decision, a significant portion of them changed their
decision from pre-discussion to final disposition.

Overall

changes were reported, in percentages of cases processed by
councils:

31.9% in the Eastern District of Michigan between

1960 and 1965;

19.8% in the Eastern District of New York,

for the years 1962 through 1964, and 42% for the year 1973;
33% in the Northern District of Illinois during 1973;

and

43.1% in the simulation study).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

s
34

Based on the above findings both from the laboratory
and the field, it can be expected that relatively more
judges who participate in sentencing councils will change
their initial sentence than a control group of judges who
engage in an alternative activity such as writing a
sentencing opinion.

Reduction of Variability
If the analogy of the defendant as an ambiguous
stimulus is correct, we would expect that judges' sentencing
behavior would be less variable after discussion of the
defendant's case in the sentencing council.

The

observations and archival analyses by Levin (1969) and
Zavatt (1967) have led to claims of this effect but the
evidence these authors present is not conclusive.

For

example, Chief Judge Levin's report provides an enthusiasic
description of the workings and accomplishments of the
sentencing council in the Eastern District of Michigan
(Detroit) on its first five years of existence but the only
evidence regarding reduction in disparity he provides is a
commentary on the uniform philosophy that supposedly
developped within this group.
We are getting closer in the developent of a
uniform philosophy.
The meetings consume less
time now than they did five years ago.
The range
of the varying recommendatins has become
increasingly narrow.
We have particularly
experienced a substantial decrease in the
frequency with which the Council is confronted by
disagreement about the type, rather than the
quantum, of the sentence.
For example, during the
Council's second year, there were sixty-five cases
in which one panel member suggested custody and a
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least one other member suggested probation.
During the Council's fifth year, there were only
about twenty-five cases in which the judges
disagreed, even initially, on whether custody or
probation was the proper sentence.
(Levin, 1969,
p. 144)
No further data are given to corroborate these
conclusions.

Therefore, the reader is forced to accept his

contentions on faith.

Similar criticisms apply to Chief

Judge Zavatt's descriptive report on the functioning of the
sentencing council in the Eastern District of New York
(Brooklyn).
A more detailed and methodologically much more rigorous
analysis of the councils at the Eastern District of New York
and the Northern District of Ililinois has been conducted by
Diamond D Zeisel

(1975).

These authors have constructed a sophisticated index of
disparity in their investigation of the Chicago and New York
district courts.

For both courts they found a reduction in

sentence variability of approximately ten percent.
Two laboratory simulation studies on sentencing
councils, using law students as mock judges, found even
greater reduction in sentence variability as a function of
group discussion

(Sporer, 1980b;

Zimmerman, 1976).

In

Zimmerman's experiment, this effect was even more pronounced
for the group decision condition in which the judges, like
sentencing tribunals, were required to reach a consensus
within their group.

Diamond & Zeisel

(1975) have

constructed a sophisticated index of disparity in their
investigation of the Chicago and New York district courts.
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For both courts they found a reduction in sentence
variability of approximately ten percent.

Zimmerman (1976),

using law students as mock judges, found even greater
reduction in variability on a sentence severity scale after
discussion.

The effect was even more pronounced for the

group decision condition in which the judges were required
to reach a consensus within their group.

However, the

absolute amounts of disparity reduction of these studies
cannot directly be compared because they have been obtained
with different mathematical estimation procedures.
It should be noted here that Zimmerman's

(1976) study

is very close both in approach and methodology to the one
proposed here.

His comprehensive investigation has shed

light on many important details of functioning in sentencing
councils.

However, it also differs in many respects from

the study proposed here.

Most importantly, Zimmerman's

experiment addressed the issue of reduction in variability
only at the within-council level, and thus has limited its
scope unnecessarily.

The present study has in addition

addressed itself to the equally important issue:

whether or

not it is possible to reduce overall sentencing variability
across a large number of judges by the use of three-member
councils.

Previous investigators and legal commentators

have failed to see this possibility, or have denied it
altogether without any evidence (e.g.

Interim Report of the

Sentencing Study Committee to the Florida Supreme Court,
n.d.) .
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A recent laboratory simulation by Sporer

(1980b) has

shown that it is possible to reduce overall sentencing
variability across judges as a function of discussion in
sentencing councils.

Using a repeated-measurement design,

both three- and two-member councils showed significantly
less variability on the prison sentence and parole
eligibility measures employed than prior to discussion.
However, all of these previous studies employed
repeated-measurement designs, and thus do not allow us to
assess to what extent reduction of variability would (or
would not) occur if the council participants had not given
their sentences prior to discussion
"pretest").

(i.e.

without a

The present study remedies these deficiencies

by employing an extension of the Solomon-four-group design
(Campbell & Stanley, 1966).

This design allows one to

assess the effect of sentencing councils with or without a
pretest, and in addition the effect of the pretest itself
and the pretest X council interaction.
In terms of the sentencing council procedure, the
pretest corresponds to the preliminary sentences judges
record on their sentencing study sheet (cf.

Levin, 1969).

It would be important to know whether sentencing variability
would be similarly reduced irrespective of whether or not
the judge had recorded a sentence prior to discussion.

The

act of writing down a tentative sentence could introduce a
commitment to this particular choice of sentence which would
make it more resistent to change through group input.
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Solomon-four-group design employed here is ideally suited to
explore these various possibilities within a single study.
In sum, it is hypothesized that post-council sentences
will show less variability than pre-council sentences, and
that post-council sentences will be less variable than
sentences meted out by a control group that did not convene
in sentencing councils.

Both hypotheses are proposed to

hold for variability across judges within councils
(within-council variability)

as well as for variability

across judges across a whole array of councils
(across-council variability).

Uniformity in Sentencing Philosophy
It has been variously asserted by proponents of
sentencing councils that the major function of sentencing
councils should be and has been to create a more uniform
sentencing policy (e.g.
Zimmerman, 1976).

Levin, 1969;

Parsons, 1964;

However, data obtained over several years

of operation of existing sentencing councils are at best
equivocal on this issue
Levin, 1969;

(cf.

Zavatt, 1967) .

Diamond & Zeisel, 1975;
Methodologically, this claim

requires a longitudinal design, but at this point there is
no conclusive evidence supporting this contention.
Therefore Zimmerman was not surprised that he could not
obtain increases in uniformity in pre-council sentences over
the short time span of his simulation consisting of nine
cases.
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However, there is an alternative way to conceptualize
this issue.

"Uniform sentencing policy" is not well defined

and consequently can mean a variety of things to different
authors.

One aspect that has been repeatedly noted as an

important determinant of sentencing behavior is the judge's
sentencing philosophy (e.g.
O'Donnell et a l ., 1977).

Hogarth, 1971;

McFatter, 1978;

For example, Hogarth

(1971) has

shown that Canadian sentencing magistrates differ greatly in
their view on the classic doctrines of criminal sanctions,
i.e., reformation (rehabilitation), general deterrence,
individual deterrence, punishment and incapacitation.
Now, provided that such large individual differences
exist, and that these views are amenable to change, it
should be possible that an exchange of ideas on judges'
penal philosophies should reduce some of these differences,
and hopefully, in turn, reduce sentencing variability.

This

is the notion underlying the implementation of sentencing
institutes and judicial education.

But again, conclusive

evaluative data on their impact on sentencing are hard to
come by (cf.

Youngdahl, 1969).

Therefore, the present

study attempted to determine the effect of discussion of
sentencing philosophy directly by testing the effectiveness
of an "extended sentencing council" that would be induced to
discuss the goals of sentencing in addition to the
discussion of the sentences proposed and the specific
sentencing reasons.

It was hypothesized that sentences

meted out after discussion of sentencing goals in the
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extended council would be less variable than in the "normal
council" or in the "no-council" control group.

Penalty Shifts

(Leniency / Severity Shifts)

Informal observations and archival analyses by Frankel
(1972), Levin (1969), and Zavatt (1967) tentatively suggest
that post-council sentences tend to be more lenient than
pre-council sentences, especially with regard to a more
frequent choice of probation over prison sentences.
However, these trends are subject to large temporal
variations, and their interpretation is highly problematic
(see Chapter III).

Other investigators who have adopted a

social-psychological perspective have attempted to
re-conceptualize penalty shifts (leniency shifts and
severity shifts)

as particular instances of the polarization

phenomenon that has frequently been observed as a function
of group discussion.

The group polarization hypothesis

(originally coined by Moscovici & and Zavalloni, 1969, and
further promulgated by Moscovici and Doise, 1974, Myers and
Lamm, 1976, and Lamm & Myers, 1978)

is an extension of the

former "risky" shift and choice shift literature (e.g.
Brown, 1965;
1970;

Cartwright, 1971;

Pruitt, 1971a and b ) .

Dion, Baron, & Miller,

Zimmerman

(1976) also applied

the choice shift literature to laboratory simulations of
judicial sentencing, leading him to predict a general
leniency shift tendency as a function of group discussion.
He obtained a leniency shift from prison to probation
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sentences but no reduction in length of sentence.

Sporer

(1980b) obtained significant leniency shifts for both threeand two-member councils on a parole eligibility measure but
not for the prison sentence measure.
A series of other investigators on jury decision making
some of which incorporated some form of punishment or
sentencing scales as dependent variables also observed a
general tendency toward leniency (Davis, Kerr, Stasser,
Meek, & Holt, 1976;
Myeers, 1978;
1973;

Foss & Foss, 1973, cit.

Gleason & Harris, 1976;

Rumsey, 1976;

Laughlin & Izzett,

Rumsey, Allgeier, & Castore, 1978;

Rumsey & Castore, 1980;
1977).

in Lamm &

Rumsey & Rumsey, 1977;

Wahrman,

Others found evidence for group polarization (i.e.

both leniency and severity shifts;
Kaplan & Miller, 1978;
Kaplan, 1976;

Bray & Noble, 1978;

Laughlin & Izzett, 1973;

Rumsey & Castore, 1980;

Lastly, Heimbach (1970, cit.

Myers &

Vidmar, 1972).

in Lamm & Myers, 1978)

observed a severity shift, and Izzett & Leginski

(1974)

obtained a shift toward the middle contrary to the group
polarization hypothesis.

To the extent that these

experiments on juries are relevant to studies on judicial
sentencing— juries are more concerned with finding of facts
and verdicts of guilt or innocence than with sentencing
decisions (cf.

Sporer 1978, 1979;

Weiten & Diamond, 1979;

Vidmar, 1979) — the present study could shed some light on
the differences in paradigm in which one would or would not
expect leniency shifts, severity shifts, or both.

Taken
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together, both field and laboratory studies indicate a weak
general tendency toward a leniency shift as a function of
group discussion, and could therefore also be expected in
this experiment.

The leniency shift would also be of

practical importance, considering the pleas for reduction of
incarcerative sentences by contemporary reformers (see
Chapter I ) .
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CHAPTER

V

METHOD

Participants
Participants were 277 (136 male and 141 female)
psychology students in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of an introductory psychology course.
were assigned to the experimental conditions.

They

The

experiment was carried out at fifteen different sessions,
each with about 15 to 30 students.

Mater ials and Procedure
Participants were presented with a fictitious case of
armed robbery for which the defendant had pleaded guilty
(see Appendix:

Case Summary).

The defendant was described

to have been convicted of armed robbery once before.

The

case description was modeled after case descriptions
normally found in presentence reports prepared by the
probation officer or some other court official

(cf.

Poulos,

1976) .
The experimenter

(the same for all sessions)

introduced

the experiment as a study in "Legal Psychology," dealing
with judicial sentencing.

Participants received one booklet
43
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containing:

(1) A cover page with a short introductory

paragraph and questions to fill in the participant's sex,
age, and year in school;

(2)(a) a pretest assessing the

participant's sentencing philosophy (Sentencing Philosophy
Scale, see Appendix:
1971)

Goals of Sentencing;

cf.

Hogarth,

in the "pretest" condition, or (b)an alternative

assessment scale in the "no pretest" condition (an
acquiescence-free version of the California F Scale (Byrne,
1974);

(3) the case description;

condition only:

(4) in the "pretest"

a scale for the prison sentence and parole

eligibility decisions (see Chapter VIII on the validity of
these scales) , rating scales for the confidence in the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions, as well as
rating scales for the offense and the offender;
"pretest" condition only:

(5) in the

an Information Checklist;

(6) (a)

a Sentencing Opinion Sheet in the "no-council" condition,
(b) a Sentencing Council Instruction to discuss the
sentences and the reasons for the sentences with the other
council members ("council" condition),

(c) a Sentencing

Council Instruction to discuss the goals of sentencing, the
sentences, and the reasons for the sentences given;

(7)

prison sentence and parole eligibility, confidence rating
and offense and offender scales as in (4) but with slightly
differring instructions, according to the experimental
condition;

(8) an Information Checklist;

Sentencing Philosophy Scale;

(9) the

(10) space for subjecive

comments.
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In summary, half of the participants were "pretested"
with regard to their sentencing philosophy, judgment of the
case and information use prior to the council discussion or
opinion writing, the other half were administered the
Authoritarianism Scale

(F Scale).

Orthogonally, one third

of the participants wrote a sentencing opinion, one third
were randomly assigned to three-member sentencing councils
in which they discussed sentences, and one third were
assigned to three-member "extended" sentencing councils in
which they discussed their sentencing philosophies,
sentences, and reasons for the sentences.

Assignment to

conditions and to groups within conditions was determined
randomly.
After about 20 minutes of opinion writing/discussion
participants were (again) asked to judge the defendant.
Participants in the council conditions were instructed to
judge the defendant by themselves, "carrying the ultimate
responsibility and enjoying the constitutionally guaranteed
independence of judgment."
Participants were then explained the nature and goals
of the study and thanked for their participation.

Dependent Var iables
The major dependent variables were the prison sentence
and parole eligibility measures, scaled from 0 to 20 years,
with 1/2 year intervals.

(Although the term parole

eligibility, with reference to a judge's sentencing
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decision, is technically inappropriate, it does convey the
decision on the time after which the defendant is likely to
be "back on the street" to legally relatively
unsophisticated simulation participants in an unambiguous
manner;

cf.

Chapter VII, on dependent variable validity.)

Sentencing Philosophy

("Goals of Sentencing") was assessed

with 5-point scales used by Hogarth

(1971) .

The intervals

were labeled "very important, quite important, of some
importance, of little importance, and of no importance."
Additionally, participants' perceptions of the offender and
the offense were assessed with 11-point rating scales, as
well as their confidence in their prison sentence and parole
!

!
1

eligibility decisions.
The Information Checklist consisted of a numbered list
of facts all contained in the case participants had read
previously.

Participants rated the facts they found most

important for their decision separately for prison sentence
and parole eligibility on a scale from one to five (not at
|
I

all important to extremely important).

!

i

i

t

I
!

i

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

CHAPTER

VI

RESULTS

Overview of Design and Analyses
The over-all design of the study was an extension of
the Solomon-four-group design (Campbell & Stanley, 1966)

to

a six-group design, with the two levels of the pretest
factor completely crossed with the three levels of the
council factor.

Although there is no single overall way to

analyze this design (Campbell & Stanley, 1966) , it provides
several strong tests for the hypotheses advanced here.

The

tests will be described separately for each set of
hypotheses.

Variability Within Councils
Between-groups Analyses
To assess the effectiveness of sentencing councils in
reducing within-council variability, a 3X2 (council X
pretest) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
performed with the posttest standard deviations of prison
sentence and parole eligibility measures as dependent
variables.

Table 1 shows the mean standard deviations for

both dependent variables.

The MANOVA yielded significant
47
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Table 1

j
j

M e a n standard deviations of the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions for

i

posttest scores

for three-member councils

Council

Pretest

(N = 92)

No Pretest

Conditions

Marginal
Means

Dependent
Variable
No
Council

Council

prison sentence

3.76

2.56

3.12

parole eligibility

2.32

1.83

2.06

(n=13)

(n=15)

prison sentence

2.03

1.42

1.73

parole eligibility

1.32

1.36

1.34

(n=17)

(n=16)

Extended

prison sentence

2.07

1.25

1.68

Council

parole eligibility

1.38

1.01

1.20

(n=16)

(n=15)

prison sentence

2.53

1.73

parole eligibility

1.62

1.40

Marginal means

Note.

All entries are given in terms of years.
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main effects for both the council
4.39, £<.002)

(multivariate £(4,170)

=

and pretest variable (multivariate £(2,85) =

3.53, £<.034).

The council main effect was highly

significant for both prison sentence and parole eligibility
measures (univariate £(2,86)
5.31, £<.007, respectively).

= 8.48, £<.001 and £(2,86) =
As predicted, this effect was

due to the much lesser variability observed for the council
conditions as opposed to the no-council conditions, as
revealed by an a priori special comparison between the
no-council condition and the combined council and extended
council conditions

(multivariate £(2,85) = 8.63, £<.001;

univariate tests for prison:
for parole:

£(1,86)

£(1,86)

= 10.10, £<.002).

= 15.98, £<.001;

and

The differences

between the council and the extended council condition were
not significant (all F's<l).
The main effect observed for the pretest was
significant for the prison variable (£(1,86) = 7.01, £<.01),
but not for parole eligibility (£(1,86) = 1.28, n.s.).
Pretested groups showed, on the average, significantly
larger variability in prison sentences than non-pretested
groups.

The difference for parole eligibility was in the

same direction.

The council X pretest interaction was not

significant (all £'s<l).

The latter interaction mormally

ought to be interpreted with caution if one adjusts the
probability level for the fact that two dependent variables
were employed in the absence of a multivariate test.

But

the pattern of results was exactly parallel for both

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

50

dependent variables rendering interpretation of this
interaction unproblematic.

Repeated-measures Analyses
Approximately one-half of the participants judged the
defendant both before and after council discussion (writing
a sentencing opinion in the no-council condition).

For this

half of the extended Solomon-four-group design, it is
possible to assess the direct effects of the council
intervention and of the pretest, as well as their possible
interaction.

For this purpose two univariate analyses of

variance (ANOVA's) with group standard deviations of the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions were
conducted, resulting in a 3X2 (council X time) design, with
repeated measures
writing))

(before/after discussion (opinion

on the second factor.

Table 2 shows the mean

standard deviations for both variables.
The pattern of results is highly similar for both
variables.

While there were no main effects for the council

variable (prison:

F(2,43) = 1.76, n.s.;

parole:

F(2,43)

1.75), both "time" and the time X council interaction were
highly significant for both prison and parole variables.
Prison sentences varied considerably less after the council
discussion (time main effect:
time X council interaction:

F(l,43) = 18.60, £<.001;
F(2,43) = 6.21, £<.004), and

the same held true for the parole eligibility measure
main effect:

£(1,43)

= 7.50, £<.009, time X council
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Table 2
Mean standard deviations of the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after
council discussion / opinion-writing

Council

Before

(N = 46)

After

Conditions

Marginal
Means

Dependent
Variable
No

prison sentence

3.62

3.77

3.69

parole eligibility

2.20

2.32

2.26

prison sentence

3.13

2.03

2.58

parole eligibility

1.76

1.32

1.54

Extended

prison sentence

3.28

2.07

2.67

Council

parole eligibility

2.21

1.38

1.80

prison sentence

3. 32

2.53

parole eligibility

2.04

1.62

Council
(n=13)

Council

(n=17)

(n=16)

Marginal means

Note.

All entries are given in terms of years.
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interaction:

F(2,43)

= 3.64, £<.035).

The latter

interaction becomes only marginally significant (£<.07)

if

one adjusts the probability level for the fact that two
dependent variables were employed in the absence of a
multivariate test.

Therefore, it normally would have to be

interpreted with caution.

However, the pattern of results

was exactly parallel for both dependent variables, rendering
interpretation of this interaction unproblematic.
Further analyses of this interaction revealed highly
significant simple main effects as predicted.

Variablility

was less after discussion than before in the normal council
condition (prison:
F(l,16) = 3.12;

F(l,16) = 25.6;

£<.096)

condition (prison:

£<.001;

parole:

and for the extended council

F(l,15) = 11.84, £<.004;

F(l,15) = 9.06, £<.009).

parole:

No such differences were observed

in the no-council condition (both F's <1).

For the between

groups analyses, planned comparisons revealed significant
differences in post-council variability between the normal
council and the no-council condition (multivariate F(2,42) =
3.94, £<.027;

prison:

F(l,43) = 7.25, £<.01;

parole:

F(l,43) = 5.53, £<.023), and between the extended council
and the no-council condition (multivariate F(2,42) = 4.82,
£<.013;

prison:

= 6.62, £<.014).

F(l,43) = 8.96, £<.005;

parole:

F(l,43)

The predicted differences between extended

council and normal council did not obtain (all F's <1).
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Variability Across Councils
Whereas the previous analyses focussed on the reduction
of variability within councils (i.e.

a lower level of

analysis), it was also of interest whether the council
intervention had any impact with regard to the over-all
across-council variability (a higher level of analysis).
Again, data are reported separately for the between-groups
and the repeated measures parts of the design.

Between-groups Analyses.
Originally, it was planned to conduct a series of
homogeneity of variance tests between the no-council and the
two council conditions.

However, the high correlations

observed between the cell means and the respective cell
standard deviations for both prison sentences (£=.990) and
parole eligibility (£=.866) do not warrant these analyses
with the given data because the differences in variances may
be due to their relative positions on the scales rather than
reflect true differences.

Table 3 shows the cell means and

standard deviations for the posttest scores of prison
sentence and parole eligibility.
Whereas the pattern of the standard deviations of the
pretested participants was consistent with the reduction of
variability hypothesis, the results for the non-pretested
participants was out-of-line with these predictions.

In

fact, prison sentences and parole eligibility measures in
the no-pretest council condition were much more variable
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Table 3
Cell means and standard deviations of the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions
for posttest scores

(N = 277)

Council

No Pretest

Pretest

Conditions

M

S

M

S

Dependent
Variable
No
Council

prison sentence

5.20

3.67

4.46

3.07

parole eligibility

2.95

2.43

2.52

2.14

(n=40)

Council

(n=4 5)

prison sentence

4.90

3.36

6.60

5.30

parole eligibility

2.89

1.90

3.62

2.87

(n=51)

(n=4 8)

Extended

prison sentence

4.60

3.02

4.51

3.23

Council

parole eligibility

2.77

2.06

2.49

1.82

(n=4 8)

Note.

(n=4 5)

All entries are given in terms of years.
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Table 4
Cell coefficients of variation

(s/M) of the

prison sentence and parole eligibility measures
for posttest scores

(N = 277)

Council
Conditions

Pretest

No Pretest

Dependent
Variable
No
Council

Council

prison sentence

.706

.688

parole eligibility

.823

.849

(n=40)

(n=45)

prison sentence

.686

.803

parole eligibility

.657

. 793

(n=51)

(n=4 8)

Extended

prison sentence

.657

.716

Council

parole eligibility

.744

.731

(n=4 8)

(n=4 5)

Note.

The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the

standard deviation and the mean

(s/M).
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Table 5
Cell means and standard deviations of the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after
council discussion / opinion-writing

Council

(N = 139)

After

Before

Conditions

M

s

M

S

Dependent
Variable
prison sentence

4.99

3.67

5.20

3.67

parole eligibility

2.68

2.24

2.95

2.43

prison sentence

4.61

3.61

4.90

3.36

parole eligibility

2.60

1.81

2.89

1.90

Extended

prison sentence

4.50

3.62

4.60

3.02

Council

parole eligibility

2.80

2.57

2.77

2.06

No
Council
(n=40)

Council

(n=51)

(n=4 8)

Note.

All entries are given in terms of years.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

58

council condition:
condition:

F(l,46) = 5.93, £<.018;

F(1,49)<1, n.s.;

= 2.02, n.s.).

council

no-council condition:

F(l,38)

However, these analyses are to be

interpreted with caution because (a) the probability levels
have to be halved to control for experimentwise error, and
(b) the means and standard deviations are also moderately
correlated although not as highly so as in the
between-groups analyses (prison sentence:
eligibility:

£=.420).

£=.356;

parole

The same pattern of results is

obtained with coefficients of variation (see Table 6).
Taken together, these findings tentatively indicate
that across-council variability was significantly reduced as
a function of the extended council intervention but not as a
function of the normal council or opinion-writing
(no-council)

intervention.

Leniency/Severity Shifts
Also of interest is the possibility of leniency or
severity shifts as a function of group discussion.
Generally, shifts in mean sentences are used as an indicator
of leniency or severity shifts.

However, the overall

distribution as well as almost all of the within-cell
frequency distributions for the prison sentence and the
parole eligibility scores were found to be positively skewed
(i.e.

the mean was almost always larger than the median).

Therefore,

it is important to look at the means and the

medians conjointly.

Table 7 displays the cell means and
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Table 6
Cell coefficients of variation

(s/M) of the

prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after
council discussion / opinion-writing

(N = 139)

Council
Conditions

Before

After

Dependent
Variable
No
Council

Council

prison sentence

.735

.706

parole eligibility

.836

.824

(n=4 0)

(n=4 5)

prison sentence

.783

.686

parole eligibility

.696

.658

(n=51)

(n=48)

Extended

prison sentence

.804

.657

Council

parole eligibility

.918

.744

(n=4 8)

(n=45)

Note.

The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the

standard deviation and the mean

(s/M).
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Table 7
Cell means and medians of the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions
for posttest scores

(N = 277)

Council

Pretest

Conditions

No Pretest

M

Md

M

Md

prison sentence

5.20

4.86

4.46

4.10

parole eligibility

2.95

2.25

2.52

2.19

Dependent
Variable
No
Council

(n=40)

Council

(n=45)

prison sentence

4.90

4.67

6.60

5.00

parole eligibility

2.89

2.71

3.62

2.92

(n=51)

(n=48)

Extended

prison sentence

4.60

4.25

4.51

3.80

Council

parole eligibility

2.77

2.75

2.49

2.17

(n=48)

Note.

(n=45)

All entries are given in terms of years.
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medians of the prison and parole eligibility measures for
posttest scores, and Table 8 displays the means and medians
for the before and after council discussion /
opinion-writing conditions, respectively.
The data in the two tables reveal no reliable
systematic pattern that could be considered indicative of a
leniency or a severity shift as a function either of council
discussion or a pretest effect.

The only striking findings

are the relatively high means for prison sentence and parole
eligibility decisions obtained in the no-pretest council
condition (see Table 7).

However, closer inspection of the

data in this cell reveals that this finding is due primarily
to one council,- in which all three members gave the highest
possible sentences (20 years).

In all the other conditions,

only one other possible 20-year sentence was given.

This

cell of the design also contained three members who gave
sentences of 15 years whereas a 15 year sentence was given
by only one other participant in the experiment.

The data

for the parole eligibility measure parallel this finding:
Of the fourteen harshest parole decisions (i.e.

parole

eligibility after eight or ten years) eight were observed in
this cell of the design.
Thus, the general leniency and severity shifts obtained
by other investigators were not observed in this study.
Therefore, analyses of the other dependent variables that
were originally planned to assist in the interpretation of
potential leniency or severity shifts are unnecessary.
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Table 8
Cell means and medians of the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after
council discussion / opinion-writing

Council

(N = 139)

Before

Conditions

After

M

Md

M

Md

prison sentence

4.99

4.81

5.20

4.86

parole eligibility

2.68

2.05

2.95

2.25

prison sentence

4.61

4.77

4.90

4.67

parole eligibility

2.60

2.40

2.89

2.71

Extended

prison sentence

4.50

3.25

4.60

4.25

Council

parole eligibility

2.80

2.00

2.77

2.75

Dependent
Variable
No
Council
(n=40)

Council

(n=51)

(n=4 8)

Note.

All entries are given in terms of years.
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Participants' ratings of confidence in their prison sentence
and parole eligibility decisions are reported below.

Changes in Prison Sentence and Parole Eligibility Decisions
as a Function of Council Discussion [_ Opinion-writinq
In the repeated-measures part of the design it is
possible to assess changes in the prison sentence and parole
eligibility measures as a function of the council
discussion / opinion-writing intervention.

Table 9 shows

the frequencies with which change (no change / increase /
decrease)

occurred in the various experimental conditions.

Overall, 46.8% of the participants changed their prison
sentence, and 52.5% changed their parole eligibility
decision between the first and second assessment.

Changes

occurred more frequently in both of the council conditions
than in the opinion-writing condition, although changes in
the latter condition were also unexpectedly frequent
(chi-square tests for the no-council vs.

the combined

council conditions were significant for both the prison
sentence:
measure:

x 2 (1) = 5.43, £<.02, and the parole eligibility
X 2 (1) = 4.27, £<.05).

Generally, among the

participants who changed, increases in both prison sentence
and parole eligibility measures tended to be more frequent
than decreases across all conditions (cf.

Table 9).

These

differences were significant for the paarole eligibility
measure (x2 (l) = 6.04, £<.02), and marginally significant
for the prison sentences

(x 2 (1) = 3.46, £<.07).
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Table 9
Frequency of changes in the prison sentence and
parole eligibility decisions as a function of the
council discussion / opinion-writing intervention

(N = 139)

Council
Conditions

Decrease

No Change

Increase

prison sentence

28 70.0%

7 17.5%

5 12.5%

parole eligibility

25 62.5%

10 25.0%

5 12.5%

prison sentence

18 35.3%

21 41.2%

12 23.5%

parole eligibility

20 39.2%

20 39.2%

11 21.6%

Extended

prison sentence

28 58.3%

12 25.0%

8 16;7%

Council

parole eligibility

21 43.8%

17 35.4%

10 20.8%

prison sentence

74 53.2%

40 28.8%

25 18.0%

parole eligibility

66 47.5%

47 33. 8%

26 18. 7%

Dependent
Variable
No
Council
(n=40)

Council

(n=51)

(n=4 8)

Total

Note.

Entries denote the frequencies with which judges did not change/

increased/decreased the number of years of imprisonment,

and the number

of years after which the defendent was to be eligible for parole.
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Changes in Prison Sentence and Parole Eligibility Decisions
as a Function of Confidence in the First Decision
Changes in prison sentence and parole eligibility
decisions were also systematically related to the degree of
confidence participants expressed in their first prison
sentence and parole eligibility decision.

The best

indicator of this relationship is the biserial correlation
(Ferguson, 1976) between participants' confidence ratings
and the occurrence of change in their decisional behavior.
Table 10 shows the within-cell biserial correlation
coefficients for the no-council, council, and extended
council conditions.
The negative correlations indicate that participants
who were less confident in their original decision were
generally more likely to change their decision after the
experimental interventions.

This relationship occurred

clearly in both the no-council and the council condition
(all coefficients were highly significant)

but it was not

evident in the extended council condition.

Changes in Decision Confidence
Besides the relationship between confidence ratings and
likelihood of decision change it was also of interest
whether individuals' confidence in their decision would
change as a function of the council discussion /
opinion-writing interventions.

Two 2X3X2 ANOVA's, with two

between-subjects factors (subject sex X council)

and one
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Table 10
Within-cell biserial correlation coefficients
between confidence in the original decision and
occurrence of decisional change

(N = 139)

Council
Conditions

r

£ less than

Confidence in
Decision regarding
prison sentence

-.404

.005

parole eligibility

-.416

.005

prison sentence

-.319

.025

parole eligibility

-.562

.001

Extended

prison sentence

-.044

n. s .

Council

parole eligibility

-.142

n. s .

No
Council
(n=40)

Council

(n=51)

(n=48)

Note.
10

All ratings are on a scale from 0 (not at all confident)

(extremely confident).

to

Number of participants are in parentheses.
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within-subjects factor

(time:

before/after council

discussion / opinion-writing)

were conducted on the

confidence ratings for the prison sentence and parole
eligibility decisions.

Table 11 shows the mean ratings of

confidence in prison sentence and parole eligibility
decisions before and after council discussion /
opinion-wr iting.
Both ANOVA's yielded highly significant main effects
for the time factor but no significant effects for the
expected time X council interaction.

Confidence ratings

were much higher after the experimental interventions than
before (confidence in prison decision:
after:

M = 6.43, F(l,133)

the parole decision:

before:

= 70.11, £<.001;

before:

M = 5.12,

confidence in

M = 5.53, after:

M = 6.60,

F (1,133) = 40.62, £<.001).
Ratings of confidence in the prison sentence decision
showed a subject sex X time interaction that reached
significance

(F(l,133) = 3.90, £<.05), indicating a stronger

increase in confidence for females than for males.

The sex

of subject main effect was marginally significant (F(l,133)
= 3.42, £<.067).
Ratings of confidence in the parole eligibility
decision, produced a significant main effect for subject sex
with males as a group (M = 6.45) displaying more confidence
than females (M = 5.68, F(l,133) = 4.15, £<.044).

The

subject sex X council X time interaction was also
significant (F(2,133) = 3.99, £<.021), apparently due to the
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Table 11
Mean ratings of confidence in
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after
council discussion / opinion-writing

Council
Conditions

Male

Council

Female

Male

Female

prison sentence

5.33

4.05

6.39

5.95

parole eligibility

6.78

3.77

7.11

5. 77

(18)

(22)

(18)

(22)

prison sentence

5.84

4.54

6.80

6.08

parole eligibility

5.28

5.35

7.12

6.42

(25)

(26)

(25)

(26)

■

Council

After

Before

Confidence

No

(N = 139)

Extended

prison sentence

5. 74

5.10

6.74

6.52

Council

parole eligibility

6.11

6.05

6.78

6.81

(27)

(21)

(27)

(21)

prison decision

5.67

4.55

6.82

6.06

parole eligibility

5.99

5.06

6.91

6.31

Marginal means

Note.
10

All ratings are on a scale from 0 (not at all confident)

(extremely confident).

to

Number of participants are in parentheses.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

69

large initial differences between males and females in the
no-council condition (see Table 11).

However, the subject

sex effects, and their interactions, need to be interpreted
with caution.

Because there were no multivariate tests

conducted with the repeated measures design, the probability
levels for the two dependent variables have to be halved,
rendering all these effects at best marginally significant.

Predicting Prison Sentence and Parole Eligibility
Decisions from General Dispositions
The overall design of this study can be split up into
two groups of participants.

At the beginning of the

experiment, one group (the so-called "pretest" group) was
administered the Sentencing Philosophy Scale, the other
group (the so-called "no pretest group") was given the
Authoritarianism Scale (F Scale).

Forward stepwise multiple

regression analyses were performed for both groups to
investigate how well the scores from the individual measures
of the Sentencing Philosophy Scale and the total F test
predicted individual participants' posttest scores on the
prison sentence and parole eligibility measures.
Of the five Sentencing Philosophy Scale measures, only
the first two accounted for more than one percent of the
variance of the prison sentence decisions
importance of special deterrence:
in the importance of punishment:
together:

2.3%).

(belief in the

1.2%, v_ = .109;

belief

1.1%, t_ = -.090;

Prediction of the parole eligibility
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decisions was somewhat better, with the belief in the
importance of incapacitation accounting for 2.2%

(£ = .150),

and the belief in the importance of special deterrence (£ =
.144) and of punishent (£ = .114)

accounting for additional

1.8 and 1.1% of the variance, respectively (together:
5.2%) .
The total score of the Authoritarianism Scale accounted
for 2.5% of the prison sentence decisions
4.3% of the parole eligibility decisions

(£ = .157), and
(£ = .207).

Generally, among the participants who changed, increases in
both prison sentence and parole eligibility measures tended
to be more frequent than decreases across all conditions
(cf.

Table 9).

These differences were significant for the

paarole eligibility measure

(

(1) = 6.04, £<.02), and

marginally significant for the prison sentences (

(1) =

3.46, £< .07) .

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION

Reduction of Variability
The findings of this laboratory simulation strongly and
reliably indicate that group discussion is an effective
means for reducing within-council variability in sentencing
behavior.

The nature of the Solomon-four-group design, and

the extension of that design employed in this study, allows
for several independent replications of this effect within a
single study (Campbell & Stanley, 1966).

As predicted, the

sentencing behavior of the mock judges was substantially
less variable after discussion in both types of council,
irrespective of whether or not judges had written their
sentences prior to discussion.
This finding replicates Zimmerman's (1976) findings
with different case materials and extends them.

The present

study demonstrated, like Zimmerman's study, that
post-discussion sentences were less variable not only when
judges had put down their initial sentencing suggestions on
paper but also when they had entered discussion without yet
having written them down.

In fact, data clearly indicated

that judges' post-discussion sentencing behavior was
71
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substantially less variable when they had not committed
themselves through writing.

Although there are no data from

this experiment that explain why this commitment effect
occurred, several areas of research in social psychology
have generated data consistent with it.
Both the literatures on attitude change (e.g.

Kiesler,

1971;

Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969)

and on conformity

(e.g.

Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) would lead one to expect that

commitment to a particular position (in this case writing
down a prison sentence)

would render one more resistent to

influence attempts (e.g.

in the group discussion)

and

therefore would reduce the likelihood of change in position
at the second assessment.

In the current study the

commitment toward consistency was not terribly strong, as
indicated by the relatively high frequencies of change
observed as a function of discussion in both council
conditions, and even as a function of opinion-writing in the
no-council condition.

A commitment effect also can be

expected on the basis of a study by Pepitone & DiNubile
(1976) of defendants.

That study demonstrated that the

public recording of ratings and punishments created an
anchoring of these judgments.
If one focusses on the no-pretest conditions, the
observed effect also lends support to the interpretation
that the defendant was perceived as an ambiguous stimulus
object.

One may also speculate that the stronger

convergence toward the mean (although not directly
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observable in the no-pretest condition)

reflects a norm

formation process typical of the judgmental processes
observed in the Sherif tradition
Sherif & Sherif, 1969).
at a common norm (i.e.

(Sherif, 1935, 1936;

It is easier for judges to arrive
an appropriate sentence) when they

are not yet committed through their pre-council decision.
The tentative nature of these speculations about the
underlying causal processes, in the absence of direct data
within this study, must be emphasized.

Moreover, in places

the data are inconsistent with these interpretations.

For

example, these speculations do not explain why there was
only a main effect for the pretest but no significant
council X pretest interaction.

One would expect such an

interaction on the basis of the theorizing advanced here.
Of course, the difference in within-council variability in
the no-council conditions is necessarily due to chance as
the triplets were constituted post-hoc through
randomization.
It should also be noted that there were no significant
differences in reduction of within-council variability
between the normal sentencing council in which judges
discussed prison sentences and parole eligibility and the
extended sentencing council in which judges also discussed
the goals of judicial sentencing in general terms.

In other

words, the discussion of sentencing goals did not lead to a
reduction of within-council variability over and above the
reduction achieved through the discussion of sentences and
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the reasons for the sentences.

It is likely that mock

judges also discussed the sentencing "goals" when they were
asked to discuss the "reasons" for their prison sentence and
parole eligibility decisions.

There is evidence that the

extended sentencing council was effective in reducing
overall variability across judges (see below).
Generally, however, the hypothesis regarding reduction
of variability across judges did not fare as well as the one
regarding reduction of variability within councils.

These

data do not indicate that variability in decision-making
across all judges was reduced as a function of the council
intervention.

The only exception was the significant

before-after reduction of variability observed for both
dependent measures as a function of discussion in the
extended sentencing councils in which judges discussed
general sentencing goals in addition to prison sentences and
eligibility for parole.

Thus, Sporer's (1980b)

findings

regarding reduction of variability across judges was
replicated in the extended council condition but not in the
normal council condition.
A variety of reasons can be offered to account for this
difference in findings.

Whereas in the present study mock

judges judged a defendant convicted of armed robbery, the
previous study involved the judgment of a case of rape which
generally is considered a much more serious crime (cf.
Coombs, 1967;

Sporer, 1978, 1979, 1980a).

The response

scales in the rape study ranged from zero to fifty years (as
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opposed to zero to twenty years in the present
investigation)

allowing for much greater initial overall

variability which was reduced as a function of the
discussion intervention.

Of course, the fact that the first

study involved law students whereas this study was conducted
with college students could also account for the difference
in findings.
In sum, the present study indicates that sentencing
councils may be a very effective means to reduce
within-council variability, especially when judges do not
write down their sentences beforehand.

However, the

evidence that sentencing councils may also reduce
variability across a large number of judges is at this point
equivocal.

Future research should focus on the question of

whether or not overall reduction of variability might be
restricted to some controversial cases in which the original
distribution of sentences is generally widely spread as well
as on which discussion formats are most likely to reduce
overall variability.

Penalty Shifts and Patterns of Change.
The penalty shifts (leniency and/or severity shifts)
observed by previous investigators as a function of group
discussion both in legal settings and in the laboratory (cf.
the review of the literature in Chapter IV) were not
obtained in the present study.

Neither the polarization

hypothesis, nor the leniency ypothesis a laboratory artifact
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created by selective was supported by these data.

In fact,

the overall higher frequency to increase, rather than
decrease, the penalties observed in both council conditions
as well as in the opinion-writing condition (cf.

Table 9)

might be more indicative of a severity shift that is not
restricted to group discussion.
Thus, the leniency shift observed by other
investigators appears to remain a relatively unstable
phenomenon that is likely to be case-specific, or, worse, an
artifact due to selective reporting and publication (cf.
Greenwald, 1975).

It is also possible that the jury

simulation paradigm, which has produced the majority of the
reported leniency shifts is genuinely different from the
sentencing council simulation paradigm employed here.

For

example, role-playing a juror may activate different values
than role-playing a judge.

These values of jurors may be

more easily enhanced by group discussion (Lamm & Myers,
1978).

Concretely, jury simulations that require both the

finding of a verdict and the giving of a sentence may be
dominated by the "innocent until proven guilty" Kalven &
Zeisel, 1966) and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" norms
emphasized by the American judicial system and particularly
strongly espoused by American college students (Silzer &
Clark, 1978;

cf.

also Cvetkovich & Baumgardner, 1973;

Rumsey, 1980) while judicial sentencing simulations may be
more likely to elicit quite different considerations

(e.g.

"safety in the streets," or, conversely,

g
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"rehabilitation— not warehousing," see Sporer, 1980a).
These differential values may then become intensified during
group discussion, and thus lead to either leniency,
severity, or polarization shifts (cf.
Baumgardner, 1973).

also Cvetkovich &

Future investigators would be wise to

distinguish more specifically between these paradigms
Sporer, 1978, 1979, 1980a and b;
Diamond, 1979).

Vidmar, 1979;

(cf.

Weiten &

They will also have to specify more

precisely the conditions (e.g.

case characteristics, mode

of discussion and decision-making etc.)
shifts (leniency and/or severity)

under which penalty

are expected to occur.

These suggestions are not meant to imply that leniency
and/or severity shifts remain a possibility we will have to
reckon with.

Instead, it appears that the sentencing

paradigm does not allow for a satisfactory definition of a
subjective neutral point against which polarization
(leniency and/or severity shifts) can be referenced
Myers & Lamm, 1976;

Rumsey, 1980) .

(cf.

Therefore, the

polarization hypothesis cannot be tested effectively within
this framework.

Generally, the results seem more indicative

of an "averaging effect"

(Baron & Roper, 1977),

i.e.

convergence toward the mean typical of judgments of
ambiguous stimuli in the Sherif tradition (see Hofstatter,
1971;

Moscovici, 1974;

Sherif & Sherif, 1969).

Jenness, 1932;

Sherif, 1935, 1936;

This averaging effect is restricted

to the council conditions of the experiment in which most of
the changes occurred, and therefore appears to have been a
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true group (or at least an information exchange) phenomenon.
It should be noted, however, that there was also a
sizable number of changes

(30% percent in the prison

sentence and 37.5% in the parole eligibility decisions)

in

the no-council condition in which judges wrote a sentencing
opinion but did not discuss the case with fellow judges.
Theories of group processes cannot account for these
changes.

Of course, these changes simply may be

attributable to chance.
few cases.

But this probably holds only for a

For the majortiy of these changes we should

search for a better explanation.
Recent theorizing and research on "self-generated
attitude change"

(Tesser, 1978;

Tesser & Conlee, 1975) may

shed some light on some of these processes.

Adopting a more

dynamic view of attitudes, these authors postulate that
(a) for various stimulus domains persons have
naive theories or schemas which make some
attributes of the stimuli salient and provide
rules for inferences regarding other attributes;
(b) thought, under the direction of a schema,
produces changes in beliefs, and these changes are
often in the direction of greater schematic and
evaluative consistency;
(c) attitudes are a
function of one's beliefs.
Since thought tends to
make beliefs more evaluatively consistent and
attitudes are a function of beliefs, thought will
tend to polarize attitudes.
(Tesser, 1978, p.
290)
As these writers use the terms attitude, evaluation,
and affect interchangeably (Tesser, 1978, n.3), sentencing
judgments may be encompassed by their general theory.

As

applied to the present study, judges would be supposed to
invoke certain schemata about the defendant as a function of
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reading about the defendant e.g.

"he was armed— he must be

a dangerous criminal", or, conversely, "he pleaded
guilty— he must be somewhat honest?").

Consequently, as a

function of further thought (writing the sentencing
opinion), these schemata, according to the theory, generate
further cognitions consistent with these schemata (e.g.

"he

could have fired the gun and killed the store-owner") , or
reinterpret inconsistent cognitions (e.g.

"even though he

is a repeat offender, we don't know the circumstances;

he

deserves another chance if he shows signs of
rehabilitation").

Accumulation of these cognitions would

lead to a "polarization" of the evaluative response in the
direction of the initial response.

It should be noted that

these processes may also take place in the group
discussions, capturing some of the variance of changes
observed there.
As plausible as this post hoc explanation appears on
inspection of the judges' sentencing-opinions, it cannot be
adequately tested with the present data.

The major

difficulty parallels the one encountered with the group
polarization hypothesis noted above:

There is no definable

subjective neutral point against which polarization could be
referenced.

Future research could investigate this

possibility through the construction of cases that differ in
the kinds of schemas they tend to invoke (as determined
through pretesting).
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It must be emphasized that the postulation of these
processes is highly speculative, and more suggestive of
avenues for future research than a serious explanation for
the opinion changes in the present data.

It should also be

remembered that the sentencing opinions were generally
rather balanced, weighing
majority of cases did

both pros and cons, and in the

not lead to changes.

Confidence in Sentencing and Parole Decisions
Discussed above were several theoretical processes
which could account for the decision changes observed.

It

is also possible to relate these changes to the confidence
judges exhibited in their original prison sentence and
parole eligibility decisions.

Levels of confidence were

originally very widely distributed across the whole scale,
and were generally good predictors for the likelihood of
change in the opinion-writing and normal council condition
but curiously not for

the extended council condition. There

is no explanation for

the absence of a significant

relationship between decision confidence and likelihood of
change in the latter condition.

In the other two

conditions, judges who indicated lower levels of confidence
in their original decisions were generally more likely to
change their decisions than judges who displayed more
confidence in their decisions.
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Also of interest is the impact of the experimental
manipulations upon judges' decision confidence.

Clearly,

discussion in the sentencing councils as well as sentencing
opinion writing boosted the judges' confidence both in their
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions.

The

impact tended to be somewhat stronger with females than with
males, largely due to the fact that males tended to be more
confident in their decisions initially.

This pattern of

results makes sense in light of the fact that participants
were asked to role-play judges who (at least at the time of
this writing)

are more likely to be males than females.

Predicting Decision Outcomes from General Dispositions
The small amount of variance of the prison sentence and
parole eligibility decisions accounted for by the Sentencing
Philosophy Scale and the Authoritarianism Scale (F Scale)
disappointing.

is

It reflects just another instance of an

issue both personality psychologists and social
psychologists have struggled with for decades:

The

inability to predict specific behaviors from more general
dispositions.

The disillusionment with the trait approach

in the psychology of personality (e.g.

Mischel, 1968), and

the perennial revivals of the attitude-behavior consistency
controversies (e.g.

LaPiere, 1932;

Wicker, 1969)

attest to

this point.
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A comparison of the behaviors elicited by the two
attitude questionnaires (Sentencing Philosophy Scale and F
Scale)

and the measures of sentencing decisions can help us

understand the weak relationships observed.

For example,

the F Scale measures general personality dispositions /
attitudes presumed to be fairly consistent over time and
situations while the judgment of a criminal offender is much
more under the control of a particular stimulus situation
(i.e.

the particular case characteristics as well as the

situational context).

Of course, this somewhat contradicts

the analogy of the defendant as an ambiguous stimulus object
which would lead one to expect that internal factors would
exert a more potent influence on sentencing judgments
Sherif & Sherif, 1969).

(e.g.

Present data, however, suggest that

the F Scale is not systematically related to the judgments
in this particular stimulus domain, at least for the
population sampled, and therefore that it does not
adequately assess these underlying factors.
The lack of a relationship between the mock judges'
scores on the Sentencing Philosophy Scale and the sentencing
decisions is, at least on the surface level, more
disappointing.

It is likely that it is due to the lack of

discriminatory power of the items on this questionnaire.
Most participant mock judges endorsed almost all of the five
sentencing goals (punishment, general deterrence, special
deterrence,

incapacitation, and rehabilitation)

less important.

as more or

Thus, they did not display the level of
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variability that is a prereqisite for a good predictor.

The

lack of predictive utility of the Sentencing Philosophy
Scale runs counter to Hogarth's (1971) study of Canadian
sentencing magistrates.

He found judges to vary greatly

with regard to the sentencing goals they endorsed, which in
turn captured a major portion of the variance of their
sentencing decisions.
McFatter

Recent laboratory investigations by

(1979) and Austin (1979) also demonstrated the

importance of selective sentencing goals for the
determination of levels of punishment.

Therefore, the lack

of a relationship between the Sentencing Philosophy Scale
and the actual sentencing decisions found in this study
could be attributed to the lack of differentiation of
sentencing goals in the population of college students
sampled.

It is possible that the lack of experience of mock

judges has prevented them from developing the relevant
schemata (cf.

Stotland & Canon, 1972;

Tesser, 1978)

that

typically would be expected to be well-represented in real
j udges.
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CHAPTER VIII

VALIDITY AND IMPLICATIONS

Inductive Approaches to Validity:
Population and Ecolocical Validity
The present experiment was designed to contribute to
the solution of a social problem observed in courts:
issue of sentencing disparity.

The

Before drawing any

conclusions on the basis of this research regarding
applicability to real world problems it is vital that we
come to grips with a fundamental issue facing all laboratory
research on legal issues:

The relationship between

laboratory research and the actual behavior of legal actors
in legal settings.
Traditionally, this question is couched in the language
of generalizability (or external validity):

How much can we

generalize from this laboratory simulation to the real world
of the courtroom?

More specifically:

How much can we

generalize from the sample under study (college students)
the target population of judges (population validity), and
how much can we generalize from the context of the
laboratory setting to the actual legal setting (ecological
validity;

cf.

Bracht & Glass, 1968, regarding this
84
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distinction).

Consequently, according to this view, the

external validity of experimental laboratory simulations is
measured on the criteria of how representative their
participants are of the target population, and how closely
they simulate the actual legal context.
The present study does not fare well _if evaluated
against these criteria.

College student mock judges are

several steps removed from the highly specific, narrowly
circumscribed target population of sentencing judges.
Sentencing judges are a subgroup of the population that
differs in age, educational level, legal socialization
(Levine & Tapp, 1977;

cf.

also Erlanger & Klegon, 1978)

and in many other ways from college students.

These

differences in legal expertise are likely to precipitate
some differences in decision-making processes.

For example,

Konecni and Ebbesen (1979) found judges, probation offecers,
and college students to differ with respect to some of the
factors that seemed to have influenced their decisions in a
simulation experiment on judicial sentencing.

Judges may

also be influenced by their past decisions in relatively
similar— or different— cases during their experience on the
bench (cf.

also Pepitone & DiNubile, 1976) .

Relatedly, Sporer

(1980a)

found that law students who

could be seen as somewhat intermediate between these two
populations on these dimensions, differed from college
students with regard to their general punitiveness (they
were less so).

Moreover, law students and college students
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were differentially affected by some of the case
characteristics under investigation.

Generally, selection X

treatment interactions, as observed in that study, pose
serious threats to external validity of these types of
studies (Campbell & Stanley, 1966;

Cook & Campbell, 1979).

However, despite these general attitudinal differences
and the differential impact of some of the case
characteristics, in that same study, there were striking
similarities to the present study in the reduction of
variability in sentencing behavior which occurred as a
function of group discussion.

Similarly, Zimmerman's (1976)

simulation of sentencing councils with law students found
reliable reduction of variability as a function of group
discussion.

Procedurally, his study differed significantly

from both Sporer's

(1980b) and the present study.

An important consideration in evaluating the use of
nonexpert decision makers as participants in simulations of
sentencing studies is that the logical alternative, i.e.

to

use real judges, may be fraught with even more
interpretational difficulties.

For example, judges would be

likely to be well aware of the disparity problem, and
therefore, would be likely to refrain from any extreme
judgments or any form of socially or legally undesirable
bias under the scrutinous observation of the scientist
representing the eye of the public (cf.
1975) .

Diamond & Zeisel,

Consequently, their behavior in a simulation

experiment may not at all reflect the nature of their
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behavior in the courtroom.

We know from studies on bail

decision-making that judges are likely to respond in a
socially desirable fashion to questionnaires
Konecni, 1975;

cf.

(Ebbesen &

also Konecni & Ebbesen, 1979).

To

conduct the present study with real judges, without creating
awareness of the experimental hypotheses, and the
concomitant response biases, would no doubt be extremely
difficult.
The ecological validity of the present study is also
rather limited.

Besides the obvious dissimilarities between

the set-up of this study and a.n actual courtroom, all
laboratory simulations of judicial sentencing have to face
their most serious short-coming:

The so-called

"paper-defendant" problem (Partridge & Eldridge, 1974).

The

sentence is given to a hypothetical defendant who exists
only on paper, i.e.

(1) without the face-to-face contact

characteristic of the sentencing hearing, and (2) without
any real consequences for a real person— e.g.
vicissitudes of long-term incarceration (cf.
Utne, 1977;

Austin & Williams, 1977).

the
also Austin &

Although it seemed

that participants in this experiment took their task as
judges quite seriously, one should not generalize directly
from the results of this experiment to the sentencing
behavior of judges.
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Deductive Approaches to Validity and
Criteria of Research
It was never the aim of this study to provide for
direct generalization to the courtroom.
approach generalizability this way.

But we should not

Implicit in these

conceptions of external validity (population and ecological
validity as discussed)
(Gadenne, 1976;

is an inductivist view of science

however, Cook & Campbell deny this) which

is no longer tenable from a philosophy of science point of
view (Hempel, 1966;

Popper, 1959).

Alternative ways to

conceptualize these issues, based on a deductive,
theory-testing approach, are available (e.g.
Irle, 1975;

Kruglanski & Kroy, 1976).

Gadenne, 1976;

Such deductive

approaches have recently been adopted to the social
psychology of legal issues (cf.
Walker

Opp, 1970) .

Lind and

(1979) make this point most succinctly:

We also argue below that empirical studies
designed to test specific theories of legal
behavior are not evaluated properly by the
simulation-oriented criterion of methodological
closeness to some actual setting and population.
Rather, such studies should be judged with
reference to the theoretical principles they seek
to test. A study designed for theory-testing
purposes is good to the extent that it provides an
unambiguous test of some essential implication of
the theory.
Practical application of the results
of this sort of study is not accomplished
directly, but comes rather from the application of
the theory itself to legal questions.
(p.
6)
Although their statement also applies to the present
study, an important difference should be noted.

They are in

a much better position because they can rest their argument
on a well-grounded theory of legal behavior, viz.

their
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theory of procedure

(Thibaut & Walker, 1978).

Yet there is

no single well-developed legal or psychological theory of
discretion or group decision-making that could be used as an
encompassing framework for the present study.
Rather, we have to choose from a whole gamut of
theories some of which may o

may not apply.

Therefore,

additional criteria of research become necessary.

Besides

the traditional criteria of scientific research put forth by
philosophers of science, e.g.
falsifiability etc.

(cf.

logical consistency,

Groeben & Westmeyef, 1975), the

criteria of technical and emancipatory relevance
1965;

Holzkamp, 1972;

(Habermas,

Sporer, 1980c) can help us decide

among alternative theories.

The present approach has

adopted an interventionist paradigm that chooses among
theories not only on the basis of their value in generating
understanding the problem of sentencing disparity but also
their potential in pointing out ways to reduce it.

For

example, general theories of norm formation (e.g.
Moscovici, 1974;

Sherif, 1935, 1936;

Sherif & Sherif,

1969) that would lead one to expect an averaging effect
(Baron & Roper, 1977)

as a function of group discussion, or

theories of group polarization (see Lamm & Myers, 1978)
would predict penalty shifts, were preferred to theories
that would not imply the possibilities of strucutral
interventions / innovations.
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Construct and Dependent Variable Validity
However, this theory-oriented approach does not rid us
of our responsibility to discuss validity issues in more
detail within this deductive framework.

In particular,

construct validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979;

cf.

Kruglanski

& Kroy's, 1979, independent variable, dependent variable,
and effect validity)

and dependent variable validity

(Kruglanski & Kroy, 1976) need to be further elaborated.
With regard to construct validity of the postulated causal
relationship between group discussion and reduction of
variability, there is now accumulated evidence that the
normalization processes
theory (e.g.

(averaging effect)

Moscovici, 1974) are likely to operate in

sentencing councils as well.
(1980b)

expected from

Zimmerman (1976), Sporer

and this dissertation all support this position

through constructive replications with different case
materials, different experimental procedures
participant populations).

(and different

Moreover, converging evidence

from anecdotal reports and archival analyses of courts
employing sentencing councils (see Chapters III and IV)
satisfy the requirement of multiple operationism (Campbell &
Stanley, 1966;

Cook & Campbell, 1979).

Such evidence,

despite the short comings, increases our confidence that
these processes may well operate in the field as well as in
the laboratory.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

91

Further evidence for construct validity is provided by
the finding indicating that the reduction of variability
effect was stronger for unpretested than for pretested
councils, by indicating differential effects for
differential manipulations (cf.

Cook & Campbell's idea of

"divergence between manipulations," 1979, p.

61).

The

pretest effect also provides support for the operation of
norm formation processes which would lead one to expect
lesser variability when judgments are started with the group
than when starting with individuals (Sherif, 1935).
The issue of dependent variable validity (Kruglanski &
Kroy, 1976) needs also to be discussed.

In many ways this

issue resembles the "paper defendant" problem discussed
above within the framework adopted of ecological validity.
However, the deductive framework here sheds new light on
this issue.

It also highlights the differences between

these approaches.

For example, based on the criterion of

"closeness to the actual legal setting," as demanded by
ecological validity, one would attempt to provide sentencing
alternatives to mock judges that portray the sentencing
alternatives available in the actual legal setting as
faithfully as possible.

This may work with legally

sophisticated simulation participants, e.g.

advanced law

students or real judges, but it also could distort the
response pattern of legally less sophisticated participants
(e.g.

college students).

For example, the present study

employed the term "parole eligibility after X Number of
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years" which was to indicate to legally unsophisticated mock
judges the number of years after which the defendant could,
at the earliest time, be released from prison.

For legally

sophisticated participants, this sentencing option would
generate much more complex computations, such as for example
"minimum sentence minus good time credit" etc.

(cf.

American Bar Association Commission on Correctional
Facilities and Services, 1974) Yet for an adequate deductive
test of the research propositions under question,

(i.e.

the

reduction of variability or the penalty shift hypotheses)

it

is not important that participants can adequately utilize
the whole gamut of sentencing alernatives.

Rather, it is

important that the changes in the dependent variables
adequately reflect the changes postulated by the theory.

We

are not interested in the absolute magnitude of the
sentences etc.

proposed but in their pattern of changes as

a function of the experimental interventions.
One major aspect of dependent variable validity, the
"paper defendant" problem, cannot easily be overcome by
laboratory simulations.
alternatives.

However, we have to consider the

For obvious ethical and legal reasons,

experimentation involving the fate of actual defendants is
ruled out.

This leaves us with post facto archival analyses

which raise an entirely new set of methodological problems
and problems of interpretation (cf.

Webb et al., 1966).
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In summary, the theory-testing interventionist approach
promulgated here provides a viable strategy to study legal
issues and to contribute to their solution by testing the
assumed effects of structural interventions.

Its value,

however, does not lie in its direct applicability to the
actual legal setting but rather in the testing of theories
which provide unambiguous insights into the (causal)
relationships between the variables under study.

These

theories, in turn, can be fruitfully applied to the real
world setting.

Of course, this approach should be

supplemented, whenever and wherever possible, by more
naturalistic "proximal" simulation experiments and jLn situ
evaluation studies

(Lind, 1978) .

multiple methodologies,

Only through the use of

in connection with theory, will we

be able to arrive at an adequate understanding of and
significant contributions to complex social problems such as
sentencing disparity.

Implications for Pol icy
Despite the restrictions implied by the foregoing
discussion,

it should be possible to derive some tentative

implications for the policy of judicial sentencing.

The

massive evidence on the existence of sentencing disparity
(see Chapter I) has made the call for solutions more urgent
than ever.

The faith of the public, and particularly of the

subpopulation of criminal offenders, in the criminal justice
system depends to a large extent on the perceived fairness
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(and effectiveness)

of that system.

The present study has accumulated empirical evidence
that sentencing disparity may indeed be reduced as a
function of group discussion among council members.

The

evidence is particularly strong with regard to the reduction
of variability within councils.

There is mixed

evidence— partial but weak support from this study, and
stronger support from a preliminary study (Sporer,
1980b)— that council procedures may also reduce variability
across large numbers of judges.

Based on this evidence, the

implementation of sentencing councils is recommended, at
least for a restricted number of cases (e.g.
on a trial basis.

felony cases)

Only when sentencing councils are

instituted on a large scale basis, will we be able to
evaluate their impact more systematically.
Of particular interest is a procedural change suggested
for the mode of operation of sentencing councils derived
from theories of norm formation processes and theories of
attitude change, and supported by data from the present
study.

It is recommended that council members do not (as

has been common practice in the few existing sentencing
councils on which information on this point is available)
record their recommended sentence on the so-called
"Sentencing Study Sheet"

(see Levin, 1969) but rather enter

the discussion without having committed themselves in this
form through writing.

Theories of norm fomation and of

attitude change and commitment, corroborated by evidence

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

95

from the present study, indicate that writing down a
sentence prior to discussion is likely to reduce council
members' susceptibility to the moderating effects of the
group.

It is suggested that this procedural change be

adopted in a systematically determined portion of the cases,
and subjected to rigorous scientific evaluation _in situ.
The council discussion experience is also likely to
enhance the confidence of judges in their decisions.
However, this should not be interpreted to mean that council
members'

reliance on other members' judgment would

jeopardize their cherished independence of judgment.

The

council's function is to be seen as purely advisory.

But

the impact of the council discussion can be expected to be
pervasive despite the stress on the independence of
judgment, as indicated by data from this and from the
previous study mentioned above.
However, the enthusiasm about the disparity-reducing
quality of sentencing councils should not be overextended.
Until it is better established that sentencing councils
substantively reduce disparity across judges and
jurisdictions,
conclusively)

(and even if this were demonstrated more
we must search for additional means to balance

the principles of equality before the law and flexibility in
decision-making.

Sentencing councils provide ways that

demonstrate that these goals are not necessarily
contradictory but can be reconciled at a higher level of
integration.

Other promising alternatives might be the
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appellate review of sentencing (see Chapter II), and
sentencing guidelines.
Appellate review of sentencing would seem a necessary
counterbalance to one potential problem of sentencing
councils— extreme judgments as a function of group
polarization.

Sentencing guidelines could be fruitful to

provide judges (and councils)
which to proceed.

the frame of reference within

The theories advanced in this thesis

could also be applied to a better understanding of the
impact of guidelines upon sentencing decisions.
Consideration of these reform proposals should not take
place in isolation but rather such consideration needs to be
related to the operation of the criminal justice system as a
system.

For example, the feasibility of adoption of

sentencing councils, as well as their potential impact upon
the backlog of cases etc., must be carefully evaluated.

It

is argued that short-sighted economic arguments are likely
to be detrimental to the functioning of the criminal justice
system, and to society as a whole.

Other reform proposals

of imminent appeal, such as "flat-time sentencing" are
likely to displace the disparity problem to other agents in
the system, e.g.

the prosecutor.

Conclusion
The empirical approach taken in this thesis can aid us
in understanding and evaluating the actual and potential
impact of structural legal interventions from a social
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psychological perspective.

It draws heavily on the existing

body of legal and psychological theory in pinpointing the
processes and evaluating and predicting the outcomes of
these interventions.

But the promises of this approach need

not be restricted to passive investigation of the status
quo.

It encompasses creative components that may provide

the leverage point for constructive change.
Other possibly more important issues are beyond the
scope of the present approach.

They can only be resolved at

a meta-level by philosophers or society at large.

For

example, the problem of sentencing disparity may be deeply
rooted in the foundations of criminal sanctions in diverse
penal philosophies.

Until society at large comes to grip

with some of these philosophical issues through democratic
means and delineates specific behavioral prescriptions with
regard to type and severity of criminal sanctions from
general principles of sentencing, individual judges (and
other societal agents)

are likely to follow their own

subjective interpretation of these abstract principles.
Disparity ensues.

Structural and procedural checks are

needed to bridle it.
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CASE SUMMARY

In the late afternoon hours of October
defendant,

twenty-eight year old George F.

10,

1975,

the

Watson, entered

a small grocery store pretending to buy groceries.

When the

defendant was alone in the store with the owner he walked up
to him and pretended to pay for a six-pack
Paul

Gregory,

63,

of

beer.

When

the owner, opened the cash register the

defendant pulled a loaded gun and pointed it at Gregory.
stepped around the counter toward the register.

Gregory was

nervously shaking and was slow to move out of the way.
defendant

pushed

him

cash from the register.
from

the

store.

aside

customer

enter the store observed part of the
shop

The

and hurriedly emptied out the

He left with a total of $345

Another

He

taken

who was just about to
incident

through

the

window and immediately reported it to the police.

The

police were able to apprehend the defendant at his apartment
soon

thereafter.

He

was

charged

pleaded guilty after he had been
owner and the second customer.
recovered.
police

which

showed

armed robbery once before.
George F.

identified

He

by

the

store

However, the money was never

The probation officer

record

with armed robbery and

studied

the

defendant's

that he had been convicted of
therefore

recommended

Watson should be given a prison sentence.
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GOALS OF SENTENCING

1.

Rehabilitation.
through

The

attempt

to

change

the

offender

treatment or corrective measures, so that when

given the chance he will refrain from committing crime.
2. General deterrence.
the

The attempt to impose a penal.ty

on

offender before the court sufficiently severe that

potential
refrain

offenders
from

among

the

general

public

crime

through

the

fear of

The attempt to impose a

penalty

committing

will

punishment.
3.

Individual deterrence.
on

the

offender

that he will

before the court sufficiently severe

refrain

from

committing

further

crime

through fear of punishment.
4.

Punishment.
the

The attempt to impose a just punishment

offender,

in

the sense of being in proportion to

the severity of the crime and his culpability,
or

on

whether

not such penalty is likely to prevent further crime

in him, or others.
5.

Incapacitation.
period

of

The attempt to protect

time

by

removing

the

society

offender

for

a

from the

community into prison.
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